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Summary 
(Keywords: pharmaceutical patens, TRIPS, right to health, access to essential medicines, developing countries, 
neglected diseases, counterfeited drugs, compulsory licences, generic medicines, Health Impact Fund) 
Until recently, the areas of patent law and human rights law were treated separately. The tensions 
between pharmaceutical patents and the human right to health could be felt already in the 1980s, when 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic broke out and the pharmaceutical company that discovered a drug which could 
be used to treat this disease decided to patent it and set the price so high, that it was impossible for most 
people living in poor countries, where the disease was most prevalent, to access them. The conflict 
intensified when 40 pharmaceutical companies decided to sue South Africa for enacting a law improving 
access to medicines of its citizens, claiming that this was in conflict with the TRIPS Agreement. The 
trial was a complete disaster for the pharmaceutical companies, which decided to withdraw the claim. 
However, from that moment on, the international community became aware of the conflict between 
pharmaceutical patents and the human right to health. 
The TRIPS Agreement represents the biggest victory of pharmaceutical companies, since it 
obliges all Member States to provide patent protection for inventions belonging to all fields of 
technology, including pharmaceuticals, for a period of 20 years. Before TRIPS, States were free to 
choose whether they would provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products. However, TRIPS also 
provides for a few flexibilities that are of value for developing countries, such as compulsory licences 
and other exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred to the patent owner. The negotiations on the 
barriers to access to medicines caused by the Agreement resulted in the adoption of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and subsequent decisions on the so-called ‘Paragraph 6’ issue. 
However, apart from the price-setting of patented medicines, the pharmaceutical industry is in the 
position to impact people’s enjoyment of the right to health through deciding on the direction of research 
and development of drugs. For those diseases that affect mostly the developing countries, the industry 
does not feel the need to develop new drugs, since it cannot recoup what it had invested into their 
development, nor gain profit from the sales of the medicines in these markets. This leads to the so-called 
‘90/10 gap’ and the existence of neglected diseases.  
This thesis starts with introducing the reader to the law on patents, by addressing the general 
characteristics of patents, while simultaneously trying to set its focus on the peculiarities of 
pharmaceutical patents. It presents the relevant international and EU documents on this issue. It then 
continues with the introduction of the right to health and the right to access to essential medicines. It 
reflects on the existing legislation on the right to health and presents all its implications and obligations 
of States stemming from it. Moreover, it establishes the right to access to medicines as a human right, 
which could be viewed as both being an indispensable part of the right to health, or arguably, as an 
independent human right, which is paving its way to even becoming a part of customary international 
law.  
The subsequent Chapters deal with the main subject of the thesis. Chapter 4 addresses the 
conflict itself and shows all the ways in which patents affect the human right to health and access to 
essential medicines. It presents the arguments of both the human rights proponents and those of the 
industry, in order to give an overall, objective picture of the conflict. It deals with the issues of neglected 
diseases, counterfeit drugs, and the particular situation in developing countries. The last Chapter gives 
an overview of existing and possible solutions to this conflict, including compulsory licences, other 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred to the patent owner, differential pricing schemes, generic 
competition and the Health Impact Fund. It also reflects upon the corporate social responsibility of 
pharmaceutical companies and good practices shown by numerous stakeholders.  
ii 
 
 
 
Preface 
During the final year of my Bachelor Studies at Union University Faculty of Law in Belgrade, I 
started thinking of applying for a Master Programme that would combine two areas of law that interest 
me the most, human rights and intellectual property. Lund University offered just what I was looking 
for. The topic of the conflict between pharmaceutical patents and the right to health and access to 
essential medicines have been my main focus from the beginning of the Programme, as it perfectly 
reflects the interdependence of intellectual property law and human rights. The thesis-writing journey 
has been very challenging, yet infinitely interesting to me, and I sincerely believe I managed to present 
this conflict in the appropriate way for the readers from all branches of law, as well as from other 
educational backgrounds. Knowing that this topic is of interest to many people and expecting further 
developments in this area would make me feel like I have achieved my goal. 
First and foremost, I am very grateful to my supervisor, Peter Gottschalk, who guided me 
throughout the writing of the thesis and provided me with extremely valuable comments on my work. 
Without his input, this thesis would not be complete. I would also like to express my gratitude to the 
Swedish Institute for providing me with the full study SI Scholarship for Eastern Europe during these 
two years at Lund University. Without both financial, and the selfless support from its staff, especially 
Rita Wikander and Johanna Jeppsson, I would not be able to achieve this. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my professors from Union University Faculty of Law in 
Belgrade for helping me develop as an intellectual and professional and the one who seeks greatness in 
everything. A special thank you goes to the late professor dr. h.c. mult. Vojin Dimitrijević and 
professors Aleksandra Čavoški, Tatjana Papić and Marko Milanović, for being my role models and my 
true academic inspiration. 
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family for their selfless support and 
patience. They have been there for me whenever I was in doubt of my writing and persuaded me to use 
all of my strength and energy in order to write this thesis. A special thank you goes to my mother, 
without whose support, love and belief in me, I would not be who I am today. Moreover, I would like to 
thank my partner, who has patiently waited two years for me to finish my Master Studies and with 
whose love, support and strength I managed to face and overcome many different challenges. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my father, stepfather, stepmother and grandparents for their 
indispensable roles in my upbringing. And finally special thanks to all of my friends, especially Željko, 
Branko, Irma, Andrea, Jelena, Ana, Deana, Slavica, Amalia, Nazlı, Yasemin, Luis, Lloyd, Dimas and 
my classmates, who had made my life richer and the time spent in Lund a great one, either by being here 
or coming to visit me. Since it is not possible to thank everyone, I would like to extend my gratitude to 
all who supported me, in one way or the other, in the course of my studies at Lund University. 
iii 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
AJIL American Journal of International Law 
AZT Azidothymidine/zidovudine 
BIRPI Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété 
Intellectuelle (United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property) 
CIPIH Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
CIPR UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
CommHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
Cong. Rec.  Congressional Record 
CPTech Consumer Project on Technology 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
CUP Cambridge University Press 
DP Differential Pricing 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EIPR European Intellectual Property Review 
EJHL  European Journal of Health Law 
Emory Int’l L. Rev Emory International Law Review 
EPC European Patent Convention 
EPO European Patent Office 
ESCR Economic, Social and Cultural Right 
EU European Union 
FTA Free-Trade Agreement 
GC General Comment 
iv 
 
 
 
GSK GlaxoSmithKline 
HAI Health Action International 
Health Care Manag. Sci.  Health Care Management Science  
HEPL Health Economics, Policy and Law  
HIF Health Impact Fund 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome 
HRQ Human Rights Quarterly 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development  
IFPMA International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations 
 
IJHR International Journal of Human Rights 
ILM International Legal Materials 
IP Intellectual Property 
IPR Intellectual Property Right 
 
LDC Least Developed Country 
Liv. L. Rev. Liverpool Law Review 
MDG Millennium Development Goals 
Metaphil. Metaphilosophy 
Mich. L. Rev.  Michigan Law Review 
Minn. J. Global Trade Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
v 
 
 
 
OJ Official Journal of European Union 
OUP Oxford University Press 
PPP Public-Private Partnership 
R&D Research and Development 
SA South Africa 
Sub-CommHR UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights 
TAC Treatment Action Campaign 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund  
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
US United States 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
UST United States Treaties and Other International Agreements  
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
WHO World Health Organization 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
vi 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Background of the topic 
The conflict between pharmaceutical patents and access to essential medicines was in the 
beginning ignored by the public, but started to receive global attention in the late 1990s, in the 
midst of the trial between the South African (SA) Government and several multinational 
pharmaceutical companies regarding the newly enacted SA Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act.1 From this moment on, it became a very important international topic, 
addressed by numerous international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as 
well as States and scholars.2 Although all of these actors recognize the urgency and necessity of 
solving this conflict, there is still no consensus on how it should be resolved, and it unfortunately 
does not look like any solution will be achieved in the near future.  
The background of the conflict is as follows. Patents for pharmaceutical products were not 
introduced in most countries until the second half of the 20th century3, mainly because of the fear 
of how they might affect public health.4 However, even before the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)5 came into force, patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals was introduced in the developed countries6 and TRIPS only strengthened this 
protection. The pharmaceutical industry was content with the provisions of this Agreement, 
unlike the developing countries and NGOs, which stressed the harmful effect it has on the 
protection of public health and access to essential medicines in the less developed parts of the 
world. These disparities in perceptions of the industry on one side, and developing countries and 
NGOs on the other, will be addressed throughout the thesis.  
When the HIV/AIDS pandemic broke out in the 1980s, the world was faced with the 
devastating consequences caused by the lack of medicines for treatment of the then unknown 
disease. Everything was put into research and development (R&D) for finding a cure for this 
disease.7 When a compound that showed activity against the HIV virus was finally discovered 
and developed by researchers in the Institute Pasteur in 1985, a drug called AZT (azidothymidine 
or zidovudine) became the first, and for a long period of time, the only treatment for HIV/AIDS.8 
This, of course, led Burroughs Wellcome (now GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)),9 a pharmaceutical 
company that discovered the compound, to file for patent protection of the medicine and 
subsequently set the price of one year’s necessary dosage at $10,000 per patient. This inevitably 
caused disapproval from NGOs and activists groups which called upon the patent holder to lower 
the price. Even though the price was cut by 20 percent in 1987, the company refused to lower it 
                                                 
1 H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (2008) OUP, pp. 12-
15; V. Muzaka, The Politics of Intellectual Property Law and Access to Medicines (2011) International Political 
Economy Series, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 76-7; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and 
Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT31/99) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) 
SA 674; 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (25 February 2000) [PMA case]. 
2 R. S. Park, ‘The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients’ (2002) 
11 Minn. J. Global Trade Vol. 11 at 125, pp. 138-9; Hestermeyer (n1), p. 14. 
3 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 29. 
4 Ibid, p. 28. 
5 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) [TRIPS Agreement]. 
6 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 29. 
7
 See Ibid, pp. 1-4. 
8 Ibid, p. 4. 
9 http://www.gsk.com/about-us/our-history.html (accessed 10 February 2013). 
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further, justifying the price by the costs of the R&D necessary for its development. The 
HIV/AIDS pandemic is not the only example of pharmaceutical patents clashing with the right to 
access to medicines, but it is the first and the most widespread one.10 Other such instances are 
addressed in Chapter 4. It should be noted, however, that today there exist three other anti-
retroviral (ARV) drugs that are approved in the United States (US), and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) now recommends a combination of several drugs for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS.11 However, as noted by Hestermeyer, who significantly influenced the writing of this 
thesis, ‘the availability of treatment does not imply its accessibility’.12 
Although one cannot, and should not, overlook the positive impact patents have on R&D 
for new medicines, the stringent patent protection of pharmaceuticals gives rise to several serious 
problems. The first of these is the effect it has on the pricing of these products and consequently 
their availability and accessibility. A further problem surrounds the issue of neglected diseases, 
which arises due to the lack of interest of companies to invest into R&D for drugs needed to treat 
these diseases. Moreover, access to essential medicines was recognized as the ‘indispensable part 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health.’13 This makes the position of 
pharmaceutical industry, which is pushing for even stronger patent protection, a very difficult one 
to sustain. Consequently, the conflict between pharmaceutical patents and the right to health is a 
deep one, with both sides of the conflict having legitimate interests which they intend to pursue. 
The only way for this conflict to be resolved is through cooperation and mutual understanding 
between these two actors. 
1.2. Purpose 
It is said that ‘no other issue so clearly epitomizes the clash between human rights and 
intellectual property as access to patented medicines’, since ‘the idea of withholding lifesaving 
drugs from individuals suffering from fatal or debilitating diseases when the means exist to 
distribute those drugs cheaply and effectively is anathema to all notions of morality’.14 This is the 
reason why I chose this topic. 
The purpose of the thesis is to give a human rights critique on the conflict between 
pharmaceutical patents, the right to health and the right to access to essential medicines. The goal 
is to analyse the existing law on pharmaceutical patents through the perspective of human rights, 
show how pharmaceutical patents affect the right to health and access to medicines, and provide 
the reader with a human rights approach to this subject. The main question is how the balance can 
be restored between these two areas of law. Moreover, there consequently arises the question as 
to whether a change in legislation is needed, and what it should entail, so that both the 
pharmaceutical innovation and access to medicines are maximized.15 
This thesis attempts to show both sides of the pharmaceutical patents coin: namely to 
present the arguments of both the pharmaceutical industry and those in need of accessible 
essential medicines. It provides the reader with a critical assessment of the current state of patent 
legislation, as well as the human rights law, in order to point out the loopholes in both systems. 
Deriving from this analysis, it tries to provide a number of possible solutions to this problem. It 
                                                 
10 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 15. 
11 Ibid, p. 8.  
12 Ibid, p. 28. 
13 P. Hunt and R. Khosla, ‘The Human Right to Medicines’ (2008) SUR– IJHR, Year 5, No. 8 at 99, p. 100. 
14 L. R. Helfer and G. W. Austin, Human rights and intellectual property: mapping the global interface (2011) CUP, 
p. 90. 
15 See Ibid, p. 91. 
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should be noted, however, that it is upon the States and international organizations to reach an 
understanding with the pharmaceutical industry and finally find the balance between the needs of 
all the stakeholders. Hopefully, we will not need to wait too long for this to happen. 
1.3. Delimitation 
Due to the breadth of the topic, which can include the assessment of numerous human 
rights as well as intellectual property rights (IPRs), it is very important to determine the limits of 
this thesis. Thus, the thesis will only concentrate on the human right to health and patent law, 
more specifically, the law on pharmaceutical patents, and the relation between these two areas of 
law. Consequently, it will not engage in the evaluation of the relation between patent law and the 
human right to life nor the right to benefit from the scientific progress and its applications. It 
should also be noted that I will not engage in the assessment of norm conflict in international law 
as such, since this is beyond the scope of the thesis. Moreover, this thesis will not deal with the 
bilateral trade agreements concerning pharmaceutical patents and the ‘TRIPS-plus’ free trade 
agreements (FTAs), nor the human rights obligations and responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
companies (although it may touch upon these topics as a matter of reference). Even though these 
areas are closely related to the subject of this thesis, much more time and further resources would 
be needed to cover all of them in a manner suitable for a master thesis. Furthermore, the barriers 
in relation to access to essential medicines will be presented from the perspective of developing 
and the least-developed countries (LDCs), meaning that the problems faced by certain groups of 
people in the developed countries will not be covered. Finally, since this topic represents a matter 
to which mostly universal norms apply, in contrast to regional ones, the regional instruments will 
only be referred to when they need to serve as an example of good practice or as a point of 
reference. 
1.4. Methodology and material 
This thesis combines the traditional legal method of interpretation with a sociological and 
human rights approach. It presents the patent law as it is today and examines its impact on the 
society and the human rights law and vice versa. It uses the so-called ‘human rights critique’ of 
the current patent legislation. This is because the human rights scholars and activist have, from its 
beginnings, taken an opposing approach towards the intellectual property (IP) protection of 
essential medicines, especially the extensive patent protection provided under the TRIPS, due to 
its negative impact on the right to health. The human rights approach and critique of the WTO 
rules and IP law has been said to be the most important when it comes to assessing the conflict 
between human rights law and trade rules.16 This is so because the human rights framework 
‘shifts the focus’ of the analysis of the impact of IPRs over the human right to health, by 
reframing the ‘existing legal discourses that privilege legal rules protecting intellectual property 
over those protecting individual rights and social values’, by providing ‘a mechanism to hold 
governments accountable for providing at least minimal levels of health care’, and by 
emphasizing ‘the need to restructure incentives for medical research and innovation toward the 
treatment of neglected diseases and the health needs of the poor’.17 Through this method, 
therefore, I will show the reader how these two areas of law are intertwined and interrelated, and 
how one affects the other. 
                                                 
16 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 182. 
17 Helfer and Austin (n14), p. 144. 
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Throughout the history of the human rights law, scholars have made a distinction between 
civil and political rights on one side, and economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs) on the 
other, which resulted in the drafting of two separate Covenants, which each dealt with only one 
set of rights.18 Although the Vienna Declaration adopted in 1993 clearly stated that ‘[a]ll human 
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’ and that ‘[t]he international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and 
with the same emphasis’,19 there has always been an evident difference in the treatment of these 
two sets of rights, in a way that ESCRs have until recently been neglected.20 The most evident 
instances of the neglect of human rights in general can be seen in the ‘predominance of market 
discipline’ over human rights in a way that ‘human life [and other human rights] has value as far 
as it contributes to [profit]’.21 Evans calls this ‘the Dutch auction’ of human rights, meaning that 
less developed countries are willing to sacrifice the social and economic rights of their citizens in 
order to attract foreign investments.22 Moreover, this corporate pressure is evident in major 
international organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), where human rights activists are considered as a ‘threat to the further 
expansion of corporate activities’ or simply exempt from major negotiations in these 
organizations.23 
For these reasons, this thesis will attempt to provide a human rights approach to the 
subject of patent law and the human right to health in order to overcome the attempts of the 
business world to marginalize human rights in their pursuit of profit. It is true that human rights 
vocabulary and aspirations may seem too utopian and unrealistic. However, this thesis will 
attempt to stay as realistic as possible, taking into account both the interests of the people in need 
of essential medicines and that of the pharmaceutical companies. In doing so, I will present and 
analyse the instruments dealing with patents as well as human rights, and the commentaries of 
relevant international bodies and distinguished scholars. This thesis is influenced by the works of 
some of the most prominent names in this area, such as Thomas Pogge, Herman Hestermeyer, 
Paul Hunt, Ellen ’t Hoen and Frederic Abbott, as well as the reports and official documents of 
highly respected NGOs and international organizations, and it will try to build on their 
indispensable findings and comments.  
 Of course, the discourse in this thesis shall strive to avoid the unintentional victimization 
of people in developing countries or the portrayal of the pharmaceutical industry as the ‘villain’ 
solely responsible for the current situation regarding access to essential medicines. However, 
although there are other actors responsible, the biggest reason why people in developing 
countries lack access to essential medicines, in my opinion, is the fact that pharmaceutical 
companies are unwilling to consider lowering the prices of medicines in certain countries, or at 
least lowering the patent protection of the medicines in favour of companies manufacturing 
generic drugs and medicines so that they can produce the medicines at lower costs. Finding a 
balance is easier said than done, but a constructive critique cannot do any harm. 
                                                 
18 Hestermeyer (n1), pp. 81-3. 
19 UNGA, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’, World Conference on Human Rights, A/CONF.157/23, 
12 July 1993, para. 5. 
20 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 83. 
21 T. Evans, ‘International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge’ (2005) 27 HRQ at 1046-1068, p. 1057. 
22 Ibid, p. 1059. 
23 Ibid, p. 1064. 
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1.5. Outline 
This thesis has the following structure. The first Chapter deals with the law of patents as it 
exists today, concentrating primarily on the provisions relevant to pharmaceutical patents and the 
situation in developing countries. It presents the main characteristics of patents in general, 
peculiarities of pharmaceutical patents and the relevant international documents, while briefly 
touching upon regional ones as well. Finally, it analyses whether IPRs can be viewed as human 
rights in the context of Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)24 and Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).25 This 
Chapter may appear overly technical, but in order to understand how pharmaceutical patents 
affect the human right to health, one needs to be aware of the law and rules surrounding patents 
in general, what pharmaceutical patents imply and what are the current discussions and issues 
surrounding them. Only then can one engage in constructive discussion as to their impact on the 
right to health, which is presented in the subsequent Chapter. 
The third Chapter proceeds with the assessment of the right to health and the right to 
access to essential medicines, trying to establish its place in the area of international human rights 
law. In the course of doing this, it analyses the relevant human rights instruments, belonging to 
both the soft and hard baskets of law, as well as findings of esteemed scholars, in order to present 
the right to access to essential medicines as a human right. It also presents all the relevant aspects 
of the human right to health, the responsibilities of States in relation to this right, as well as the 
particular problems that developing countries are facing in relation to access to essential 
medicines. Together with the previous Chapter, it serves as a solid introduction for the main topic 
of the thesis, the conflict between these two areas of law. 
Following this, the fourth Chapter deals with the impact pharmaceutical patents have on 
the right to health. It engages in the problem of compulsory licences in developing countries, 
neglected diseases and counterfeited drugs. It tries to present the arguments of the both sides to 
the conflict. The understanding of the needs of all stakeholders is necessary because it makes the 
path to finding a balance smoother. 
The final Chapter presents a few existing and possible solutions that show some prospect 
of resolving this complicated conflict in order to find a balance between the interests of all actors 
involved. It reflects upon the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of pharmaceutical companies 
and gives an overview of good practices of both the industry and the NGO sector, as well as a 
few examples of public-private partnerships (PPPs). This Chapter is then followed by concluding 
remarks on the whole thesis. 
                                                 
24 UN, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS vol. 993, p. 3 
[ICESCR], Art. 15(1) (c). 
25 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III), 10 December 1948 [UDHR], Art. 27(2). 
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2. Pharmaceutical patents 
In order to fully engage in the topic of this thesis one first needs to learn about the basic 
rules and characteristics of patent law and the peculiarities of pharmaceutical patents. 
2.1 General characteristics of patents 
A patent can be defined as ‘a limited monopoly that is granted in return for the disclosure 
of technical information’.26 A more detailed definition would be that it is an ‘exclusive right 
awarded to an inventor to prevent others from making, selling, distributing, importing or using 
the invention, without licence or authorization’27 for a period of 20 years after the registration of 
the patent. Three types of patents can be identified, namely, product patents (patents on the 
product itself), process patents (which protect the process used to produce a product) and the so-
called ‘new use patents’ (which protect a particular use of a patent).28 
Patent law is a national law.29 Throughout their long history, patents were granted as a 
‘means to promote the industrial advancement of the nation’.30 Today, the primary and most 
emphasized justification for patents is that they represent incentives for future production of new 
inventions and for the disclosure of useful information, which would have remained a secret 
without patent protection.31 In other words, ‘[t]he patent system is based on providing incentive 
to the inventor by granting restricted monopoly rights on one hand and by encouraging 
dissemination of knowledge on the other through the disclosure of the invention’.32 The 
proponents of patent protection claim that this form of protection is in fact a ‘bargain struck by 
society on the premise that, in its absence, there would be insufficient invention and 
innovation’.33 
2.1.1. Patentability requirements 
In order to be granted a patent for an invention, the inventor needs to prove that his 
invention, belonging to any field of technology, is new, involves an inventive step and is 
susceptible of industrial application.34 The assessment of these three conditions is necessary since 
an invention that fulfils them has to be differentiated from a mere discovery, a natural process or 
a minor modification of an already existing product. An additional element in the assessment of 
the patent application that may be said to exist is the disclosure of the invention. Article 29(1) of 
the TRIPS provides that the future patent holder should ‘disclose the invention in a manner 
                                                 
26 L. Bentley and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd Edition, 2009), OUP, p. 335. 
27 CIPIH, ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights’ (2006) WHO, available at: 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf [CIPIH Report 2006], p. 
194; See also Hestermeyer (n1), p. 19. 
28 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 64; TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27(1). 
29 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 19. 
30 Ibid, p. 21. 
31 Bentley and Sherman (n26), pp. 339-40. 
32 Carlos M. Correa (ed.), ‘A Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents, Vol. I’ (2008) available at: 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=678&Itemid=1 [Guide to 
Pharmaceutical Patents], p. 4. 
33 CIPR, Final Report of the Commission of Intellectual Property Rights: ‘Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy’ (2002) CIPR [CIPR Report 2002], p. 14. 
34 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27(1); See also Carlos M. Correa, ICTSD, WHO, UNCTAD ‘Guidelines for the 
examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public health perspective – A Working Paper’ (2006) available 
at: http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/06/correa_patentability20guidelines.pdf [Guidelines 2006], pp. 3-4. 
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sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art’ 
and may be asked ‘to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor 
at the filing date or, where the priority is claimed, at the priority date of application’. 
This element is very important for the generic industry since it ensures that all the 
necessary information is disclosed so that they can reproduce the pharmaceutical product under a 
compulsory license or after the patent term has expired.35 Hestermeyer argues that this 
requirement is one of the fundamental principles of patent law since ‘patents can fulfill their 
social purpose only if Members ensure that the disclosure is really enabling and do not grant 
patents where this is not the case’.36 
What is very important in relation to developing countries’ regulation of these 
requirements is the flexibility provided by the TRIPS, which stipulates that WTO Members are 
free to define the patentability criteria as referred to under the Agreement in accordance with 
their national priorities.37 The way these criteria are assessed is relevant for public health 
purposes and access to medicines ‘[g]iven the substantial effects that patents can have on 
competition and, hence, prices of medicines’.38 
2.1.1.1 Novelty 
The first patentability requirement, the requirement of novelty, forms ‘an essential part of 
the patent system’.39 For this requirement to be fulfilled, the invention has to be ‘new before the 
date of filing of a patent application’40, meaning that it has not been previously disclosed to the 
public in any form or in any other way available as state of the prior art.41 The state of the art 
comprises ‘everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by 
use or in any other way before the date of filing of the application’42, meaning that an invention 
will be considered as a state of the art if it is available to the public and can be analysed and 
reproduced by a person skilled in the art.43 A person skilled in the art is defined as ‘a skilled 
practitioner in the relevant field, who is possessed of average knowledge and ability and is aware 
of what was common general knowledge in the art at the relevant date’.44  
A distinction should be made in relation to the absolute notion of novelty, i.e. inventions 
that are universally new in the whole world, compared to the relative novelty, where the 
invention is new within a restricted area.45 This distinction is significant for pharmaceutical 
patents from the perspective of public health and access to medicines, since if a State applies the 
relative concept of novelty, and not the absolute, it will not be in a position to decline patent 
                                                 
35 Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. 4. 
36 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 67. 
37 Guidelines 2006 (n34), pp. vii-viii. 
38 Ibid, p. 1. 
39 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 1. 
40 Ibid, p. 2. 
41 Ibid; EPO, ‘Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office’ (2010) available at: 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/7ffc755ad943703dc12576f00054cacc/$FILE/guidelines_201
0_complete_en.pdf [EPO Guidelines 2010], Part C-Chapter IV-27, 9.1. 
42 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), 5 October 1973, available at: 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html [EPC 1973], Art. 54(2). 
43 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 8. 
44 EPO Guidelines 2010 (n41), Part C - Chapter IV-33, 11.3. 
45 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), pp. 2-3; Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. 3. 
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applications for inventions that already exist in the public domain.46 In applying the absolute 
standard, the developing countries are in a position to ‘consider all types of acts, whether in 
written form or not, that may destroy [the novelty of an invention]’.47 
2.1.1.2 Inventive step 
The issue of novelty in patents is closely connected to the requirement of the ‘inventive 
step’, which is substantial in relation to pharmaceutical patents48, and which is assessed only after 
the novelty requirement is fulfilled. This second requirement is attained if ‘having regard to the 
state of the art, [the invention] is not obvious to a person skilled in the art’.49 It stems from this 
definition that the crucial aspect of the requirement is proving the non-obviousness of the 
invention. The TRIPS even goes so far as to equate these terms in a footnote to its Article 27(1). 
This term means that the invention should ‘go beyond the normal progress of technology’ and not 
merely follow ‘plainly or logically from the prior art’.50 
In the pharmaceutical industry, a high threshold for the inventive step is recommended, 
since it creates strong patents and precludes the competition from infringing them, but also 
prevents the inventor from making minor changes to the invention and thereby prolonging the 
patent duration (which leads to gaining profit from the so-called ‘evergreening’ patents).51 This 
approach requires the persons skilled in the art to be ‘particularly strict when examining the 
inventive step’ and to apply their specialized knowledge combined with a degree of imagination 
and intuition.52 However, developing countries are in an undesirable position, since both the low 
and the high threshold of the inventive step can lead to unwanted consequences. This is so for 
two reasons. Firstly, a high inventive step requirement would mean that the incremental 
innovations (modifications and improvements of existing drugs with slightly different chemical 
consistency)53 will not be protected, and the pharmaceutical industry of developing countries 
relies mostly on these products.54 On the other hand, if they opt for a low inventive step 
approach, the multinational pharmaceutical companies will obtain patents on both the existing 
drugs and their modifications, since they are in a better financial position.55 Therefore, it was 
rightly pointed out by Shabalala that ‘[d]eveloping countries will need the flexibility to alter the 
standard to fit the changing needs of industrial and innovation policy and should choose 
legislation, regulations and guidelines that will institutionalize and operationalize that 
flexibility’.56  
                                                 
46 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 28; I. Lasic, ‘Pharmaceutical patents: A General Overview and Current 
Issues’ (2012) unpublished exam paper in the course JAMR29 Introduction to European Intellectual Property Law, 
Master Programme in International Human Rights Law at Lund University [Pharmaceutical Patents Paper], p. 6. 
47 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 38. 
48 Ibid, p. 28. 
49 EPC 1973, Art. 56; EPO Guidelines 2010 (n41), Part C- Chapter IV-33, 11.1; Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents 
(n32), p. 39. 
50 EPO Guidelines 2010 (n41), Part C- Chapter IV-33, 11.4. 
51 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 46. 
52 Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. 4. 
53 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 193. 
54 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), pp. 46-7. 
55 Ibid, p. 47. 
56 Ibid. 
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2.1.1.3 Industrial applicability 
The last patentability requirement is that of industrial applicability or usefulness of the 
invention. The rationale behind this requirement is that ‘patent protection should not be available 
for abstract ideas or purely intellectual creations that cannot be put to any use.’57 The term 
‘industrial’ is used in a wide sense, and its interpretation varies from one country to another.58 
Under Article 57 of the European Patent Convention (EPC), for example, ‘an invention shall be 
considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of 
industry’. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement, in the already mentioned footnote to Article 27(1) 
stipulates that the term ‘industrial applicability’ is tantamount to the term ‘useful’. 
In the case of developing countries, it is recommended that they adopt a higher threshold 
of industrial applicability, since this will ensure that dubious inventions, i.e. those with no actual 
purpose, are not patented.59 
2.1.2 Peculiarities of pharmaceutical patents 
As already stated, patent protection for pharmaceuticals was introduced only recently, in 
the second half of the 20th century. The pharmaceutical industry needs strong patent protection of 
its products, since the costs of R&D for their production are very high, and only through patent 
protection can they encourage inventors to develop new medicines from which the whole society 
has benefit.60 Pharmaceutical patents slightly differ from other kinds of patents, since they need 
more time to be developed and granted protection.61 Before a drug can be placed on the market it 
needs to pass numerous tests in order to be proven safe and effective, and this can take up to 15 
years.62 During that time, as well as after the patent is granted, if not protected properly, 
numerous forms of patent infringement can occur.63 Three issues that are of importance for the 
purposes of the thesis, are the issues of data exclusivity and regulatory data protection, 
supplementary protection for patented pharmaceutical products and finally, compulsory licensing. 
Regulatory data protection, which is also known under the heading ‘data exclusivity’, 
refers to the period of time during which pharmaceutical companies can deny generic competition 
to use their clinical data, since they enjoy exclusive proprietary rights over them. This data 
normally involves information on the safety and efficacy of the medicine, which is important in 
the process of applying for the authorization to place a generic version of a certain drug on the 
market.64 The TRIPS, in its Article 39 obliges Member States to protect this undisclosed data, 
‘the origination of which involves a considerable effort’, against unfair commercial use. 
Additionally, it provides that ‘Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected 
against unfair commercial use’.65 Unlike the TRIPS, which does not prescribe the period of time 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p. 81; Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. 4. 
58 Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents (n32), p. 81. 
59 Ibid, p. 108. 
60 Carlos M. Correa, ‘Ownership of knowledge- the role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D’ (2004) 82 Bulletin of the 
WHO at 784-790, p. 785. 
61 Pharmaceutical Patents Paper (n46), p. 1. 
62 J. Killick, A. Schulz and A. Dawes, The Stockholm Network Experts’ Series on Pharmaceutical Intellectual 
Property Rights: ‘The special regime of intellectual property for the pharmaceutical industry’ (2008) Stockholm 
Network, p. 3. 
63 Pharmaceutical Patents Paper (n46), p. 1. 
64 Killick et al. (n62), p. 9. 
65 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39(3). 
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during which the data is to be protected, the European Union (EU) Legislation provides for a 
‘8+2+1’ data exclusivity period.66 This means that the data will enjoy an eight year period of data 
exclusivity from the date of the first approval in the EU and an additional two years of market 
protection during which the data can be used, but the competing generic drug cannot be placed on 
the market.67 These ten years can be extended for maximum of one more year if additional 
requirements are met.68 The data exclusivity regime is crucial to the pharmaceutical companies 
since it gives them an additional period of protection and incentive for further research, as well as 
the exclusive sale of their products in the developing countries’ market, which would not be 
possible if generic competition existed. However, this regime has arguably no advantages for the 
developing countries, since it is does not promote R&D there.69 These countries rely mostly on 
generic medicines for the supply of their markets. Therefore, it was suggested that ‘developing 
countries should not impose restrictions for the use of or reliance on such data in ways that would 
exclude fair competition or impede the use of flexibilities built into TRIPS’.70 
The second instrument that is peculiar to pharmaceutical patents, and that is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘special intellectual property right of the pharmaceutical industry’71, is the 
Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC). Since pharmaceutical products can receive 
marketing approval only after they have undergone a number of tests and trials, pharmaceutical 
companies are not able to recoup all that they have invested in the R&D process from the sale of 
the product before the patent protection period expires.72 In 1998, a survey of more than 300 
pharmaceuticals showed that the effective patent protection of these products in the EU lasts for 
eight years.73 This is the reason why the industry needed an extension of the protection period, 
and this was achieved in the EU through the adoption of the SPC Regulation.74 This Regulation 
provides for the grant of a SPC which has the same effect as a patent, but does not extend the 
duration of the patent term as such. It is a sui generis instrument which has the effect of a limited 
extension of protection.75 The period of supplementary protection starts when the patent 
protection has expired and cannot exceed five years.76 Through this instrument, pharmaceutical 
companies ‘can get back’ the time they have ‘lost’ between the lodging of the patent and the 
gaining of the marketing authorization. However, this system can be easily misused by 
pharmaceutical companies, as was the case with the AstraZeneca Group (AZ) in relation to an 
ulcer drug called Losec.77 The company was brought before the General Court of the EU on two 
charges. The first charge was for misleading representations made before the patent offices in 
                                                 
66 Killick et al. (n62), p. 9; Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency Regulation 726/2004 (OJ L 136/1, 30.04.2004), Art. 
14(11); Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 
2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, pp. 34-57, 
amending Article 10 of Directive 2001/83), Art. 1.  
67 Killick et al. (n62), p. 9; see also CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 125. 
68 Kilick et al. (n62), pp. 9-10. 
69 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 125; Pharmaceutical Patents Paper (n46), p. 8. 
70 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 126. 
71 Killick et al. (n62), p. 5. 
72 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
73 G. Tritton et al., Intellectual Property in Europe (Second Edition, 2002) Sweet and Maxwell, p. 177. 
74 Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for 
medicinal products (OJ L 182/1, 02.07.1992). 
75 Tritton et al. (n73), p. 177. 
76 Council Regulation 1768/92 (n74), Art. 13. 
77 Astra Zeneca v. Commission, Case T-321/05, Judgement of the General Court, 1 July 2010, ECJ, paras. 1-2. 
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several European countries. The second charge was for the attempt to deregister the marketing 
authorisations for Losec capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and withdraw them from 
their markets, while launching Losec MUPS tablets instead.78 The Court found that  
[p]atent protection is central to the encouragement of innovation in economically 
viable conditions and it is therefore necessary to recognise a public policy imperative 
that undertakings should not be unduly deterred from registering patents in the 
pharmaceutical sector under the SPC scheme.79 
The Decision of the Court was to fine AZ a total of €60 million for misusing the patent 
system in order to unlawfully obtain a SPC which was done with the intention to block or delay 
market entry for generic competitors to Losec and keep the price of the drug artificially high.80 
One of the Commissioners stated that, although she fully supports strong patent protection for 
new innovative products in order to redeem the R&D investments, it is for the legislator to decide 
which period of protection is adequate. She also stressed that generic drugs ‘keep costs down’, 
which is beneficial for both health care systems and patients, and that ‘competition from generic 
products after a patent has expired itself encourages innovation in pharmaceuticals’.81 The appeal 
of AZ before the Court of Justice of the EU was dismissed in December 2012, and the Court 
upheld the previous decision.82 
Thirdly and finally, compulsory licences are an instrument that allows for persons other 
than the patent owner to exploit the invention without the patent owner’s consent, when he is 
unable or unwilling to do so.83 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(Paris Convention) first introduced compulsory licenses that could be issued ‘to prevent abuses 
which may result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, 
failure to work.’84 The TRIPS also provides for the possibility of issuing these licenses under 
certain conditions.85 They became an issue when they were placed under the scrutiny of the 
international community at the WTO discussions about access to essential medicines in 
developing countries,86 and the subsequent conference in Doha contributed to further 
development in this area. This will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. 
2.2 International and regional (EU) documents 
2.2.1 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
In its early stages, patent law was limited mostly to a small number of bilateral treaties.87 
This remained so until a conference held in Paris in 1878 and the adoption of the Paris 
Convention in 1883, which was last amended in 1979. This Convention was the first multilateral 
treaty which dealt with all aspects of industrial property.88 It provides that industrial property 
                                                 
78 Ibid, para. 8. 
79 Ibid, para. 313. 
80 Competition: Commission fines AstraZeneca €60 million for misusing patent system to delay market entry of 
competing generic drugs, IP/05/737, Brussels, 15.06.2005, p. 1.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Astra Zeneca v. Commission, Case C-457/10 P, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 6 December 2012, ECJ.  
83 Bentley and Sherman (n26), p. 578. 
84 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305 [Paris Convention], Art. 
5(A(2)). 
85 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31. 
86 Bentley and Sherman (n26), p. 578. 
87 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 34. 
88 Paris Convention, Art. 1(2). 
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shall be understood in the broadest sense, thereby including ‘activities and products which would 
otherwise run the risk of not being assimilated to those industry proper’.89 The Convention 
establishes the Paris Union for the protection of industrial property, composed of Countries to 
which the Paris Convention applies. The administrative tasks of the Union are today conducted 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).90 
The key principle of the Convention, included already in its original text from 1883, is the 
principle of national treatment.91 It provides that a State that is a Member of the Union has to 
offer the same protection of industrial property to nationals of other Members of the Union as it 
offers to its own nationals, without discrimination.92 The Convention, however, does not include 
a definition of a patent, and leaves it to each Member to define it in its national legislation.93 With 
regard to pharmaceutical patents, the most relevant provisions of the Convention are the 
previously mentioned Article 5(A(2&4)), which deals with compulsory licenses, and Article 
10bis which provides for the protection against unfair competition. 
Article 5(A(2)) establishes that each country has the right to take legislative measures and 
grant compulsory licenses in order to prevent the patent owner from abusing his or her exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent, such as failure to work. These abuses include, inter alia, refusal of 
the patent owner to grant a license on reasonable terms, failure to supply the domestic market 
with sufficient amounts of the patented product or setting unreasonably high prices for the 
product in question.94 It also stipulates that compulsory licenses are non-exclusive and non-
transferable in order to prevent misuse of the compulsory license by the grantee of the license.95 
The original text of the Convention did not include a provision on repression of unfair 
competition and Article 10bis was inserted into the Convention at the Revision Conference held 
in 1900.96 Under this Article, States Members of the Union are obliged to ensure that nationals of 
other Members are effectively protected against unfair competition. The Article defines unfair 
competition as ‘any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters’.97 Paragraph 3 then lists acts which will be considered as unfair competition, and which 
constitute a minimum which needs to be prescribed in national laws, leaving room for the 
Members to include other acts which fall into this category.98 
Even though it was the first multilateral treaty that provided protection for patent rights, 
developed countries were very sceptical about it, mainly because developing countries did not 
want to sign the Convention and include the provisions on industrial property protection into their 
legislation, thereby opening doors for all sorts of patent infringement in their territories.99 The 
other obstacles which developed states pointed out were: the lack of effective enforcement of the 
obligations incurred by states, the fact that there was no provision on national enforcement of 
patents, the lack of harmonized rules on the minimum patent term, compulsory licenses and areas 
                                                 
89 Paris Convention, Art. 1(3); G. H. C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property as Revised in Stockholm in 1967 (1968) BIRPI, p. 25. 
90 Paris Convention, Art. 1(1); Hestermeyer (n1), p. 35. 
91 Bodenhausen (n89), p. 27; Paris Convention, Art. 2. 
92 Bentley and Sherman (n26), p. 5. 
93 Bodenhausen (n89), p. 21. 
94 Ibid, p. 71. 
95 Ibid, p. 73. 
96 Ibid, p. 142. 
97 Paris Convention, Art. 10bis (1) (2). 
98 Bodenhausen (n89), pp. 145-6. 
99 Hestermeyer (n1), pp. 36 and 38. 
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that could be excluded from patentability.100 The result of the last critique was that in 1988, 49 
member states excluded pharmaceutical patents from patentability, while 10 states excluded 
pharmaceutical processes.101 These are the main reasons why developed states insisted on a 
higher patent protection and drafting of a better treaty which would fulfil their expectations. 
Some States resorted to unilateral pressures towards developing countries in order to achieve this 
aim.102 It was not until the end of the Uruguay Rounds in 1994 and the signing of the Final Act of 
the Uruguay Round103 and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (the WTO 
Agreement)104 which included a document on the protection of IPRs, that they finally achieved a 
stronger and harmonized IPR protection. 
2.2.2 The TRIPS Agreement  
The TRIPS is an annex to the WTO Agreement, which was signed in 1994, and it covers 
all of the main areas of IPRs105 and represents ‘theoretically, one form of incentive for innovation 
in developed and developing countries’.106 The Agreement provided for the first time a link 
between IP and trade issues,107 as well as a multilateral mechanism for prevention and dispute 
settlement between States Parties. At the same time, it recognized ‘the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of 
laws and regulations’.108 It provides for the minimum of IP protection standards that are to be 
implemented in the laws of the Member States.109 The object and purpose of the Agreement is 
enclosed in Articles 7 and 8. Article 7 provides that both the interests of the rights holders and the 
users of technological knowledge should be taken into account ‘in a manner conductive to social 
and economic welfare’ and that rights and obligations should be in balance. Hestermeyer argues 
that ‘[a]ccessibility of medicine is one of the interests of society that have to be brought into 
balance with the TRIPS’110, and quotes Article 8 in support. Article 8 allows Members to adopt 
legislative measures for the protection of public health and promotion of socio-economic and 
technological development, since they may be needed to ‘prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by rights holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology’. 
The adoption of the TRIPS was of great importance for pharmaceutical patents, mostly 
because it provided uniformity in legislation in this area. Before its adoption, patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals was not provided for in more than 50 countries, and the patent duration was 
much shorter than 20 years.111 Some claim that the TRIPS represents ‘a victory for the 
                                                 
100 Ibid, p. 37. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid, pp. 39-40. 
103 WTO, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 2 (1999) 1867 UNTS 14, 33 
ILM 1143 (1994). 
104 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, The Legal 
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999) 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 
1144 (1994). 
105 Bentley and Sherman (n26), p. 7. 
106 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 83. 
107 Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. vii. 
108 TRIPS Agreement, Preamble. 
109 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 1. 
110 Hestermeyer (n1), p. 51. 
111 Guidelines 2006 (n34), p. vii; Hestermeyer (n1), p. 55. 
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pharmaceutical companies’112, since all States Parties are now obliged to provide patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals.113 Article 27 provides that ‘patents shall be available for all 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’ and Article 28 lists the 
exclusive rights conferred to the patent owner. Article 30, on the other hand, provides for limited 
exceptions to these exclusive rights. This Article will be addressed in more detail in the last 
Chapter. 
However, apart from extensive patent protection, TRIPS also provides for some 
flexibilities, the most important (and most disputed) of which, in relation to public health and 
access to essential medicines, is compulsory licensing provided for in Article 31.114 This Article 
sets the rules for the ‘other use’ of a patent without the consent of the right holder, which pertains 
to compulsory licences. The requirements that need to be met in order for a compulsory licence to 
be issued are extensive. Firstly, every licence is to be authorized according to the merits of each 
individual case and it may be permitted only after reasonable effort has been unsuccessfully made 
to obtain the authorization of the patent owner, except in the case of national emergency or any 
other extreme urgency, when the right-holder should be notified as soon as possible.115 In each 
case, an adequate remuneration is to be paid to the right holder.116 Furthermore, the authorization 
of a licence is limited to the purposes for which it was issued and shall be terminated as soon as 
the circumstances under which it was granted cease to exist or are unlikely to recur.117 The 
licence is non-exclusive and non-assignable.118 The most disputed rule set by this Article is 
provided in Paragraph (f) which stipulates that the compulsory licenses are to be ‘authorised 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such [licence]’. 
This paragraph has been the basis for subsequent declarations which tried to overcome this 
territorial barrier in order to ensure access to essential medicines in LDCs with undeveloped or 
non-existent pharmaceutical industries. These documents will be addressed shortly. 
Transitional provisions of the Agreement provide for a ten-year period in which 
developing countries may delay the application of the IP protection for products in areas of 
technology, e.g. pharmaceutical products119, and instead provide for the so-called ‘mailbox’ 
provisions and exclusive marketing rights for these inventions.120 This period expired only 
recently in 2005.121 Finally, Article 66 deals with LDCs and declares that these countries are not 
‘required to apply for the provisions of the Agreement [...] for the period of ten years from the 
date of application’ and that developed countries need to encourage and promote technology 
transfer and technical and financial cooperation in relation to these countries.122 One of the 
successful examples of these provisions is India, which introduced legislation on protection of 
pharmaceuticals in 2005 and, since 2000, has shown a very rapid increase in pharmaceutical 
R&D. However, this development was probably achieved because of India’s size and the 
numerous possibilities pharmaceutical companies have for the progress of R&D in its territory. 
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When it comes to smaller developing countries, however, there is no evidence of significant 
increase of R&D after the adoption of TRIPS.123 In November 2005 this transition period for 
LDC Members was extended until 1 July 2013.124 
2.2.2.1 The Doha Declaration and subsequent ‘Paragraph 6’ decisions 
As already mentioned, the territorial barrier for compulsory licenses caused heated 
debates in the WTO, mainly because of its effect on access to medicines in the LDCs which do 
not have manufacturing capacities for pharmaceuticals. This lead to this topic being the central 
one at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha held in 2001. The Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration)125 was adopted on 14 November 2001. The 
Declaration represents an ‘important milestone in the debate on intellectual property rights and 
access to medicines’126, mainly because it recognized the public health problems in the 
developing countries and stressed the need of the adjustment of the provisions of the TRIPS to 
these needs.127 It recognized the importance of IP protection, and at the same time raised its 
concerns about its effects on prices and confirmed that ‘the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all’.128 The most important provision 
of the Declaration can be found in its Paragraph 6, which stipulates that: 
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for 
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. 
This paragraph was the basis of the subsequent decision drafted in 2003. The Decision on 
the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (2003 Decision)129, also known as ‘the TRIPS waiver’130 was adopted on 30 August 2003 
and states that: 
[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to 
the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) 
and its export to an eligible importing Member(s).131  
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This decision sets out the rules and conditions for both the importing and exporting 
members in order for them to use the compulsory licensing system provided by the waiver,132 as 
well as the rules on the assessment of manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.133 
Moreover, in order to ensure that the pharmaceuticals produced under the compulsory licence are 
not exported and sold in other countries under lower prices, the Decision provides that importing 
Members need to take ‘reasonable measures’ and ‘ensure the availability of effective legal 
means’ to prevent this kind of misuse of the system.134 Pursuant to the Decision an ‘eligible 
importing member’ is any LDC Member and any other Member that notified the Council for 
TRIPS that it intends to use the system, and an ‘eligible exporting member’ is any country 
Member using the system to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible 
importing Member.135 The Decision sets out the rules on a complicated procedure that needs to 
be followed in order to grant a compulsory licence,136 which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, it allows the LDCs to extend the period for the grant of pharmaceutical patents until 
2016.137 
The process of amending the TRIPS was continued in Cancun in September 2003, where 
the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference was held, but these negotiations ‘ended in a deadlock.’138 It 
was not until 2005 that the WTO General Council decided to permanently incorporate the 2003 
Decision into the TRIPS Agreement. The Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
(2005 Amendment) was signed in December 2005, and it had very similar content to that of the 
2003 Decision.139 The Decision suggested a ‘Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’, which 
stipulated that the Agreement would be changed through Article 31bis following Article 31, and 
an Annex to the TRIPS following Article 73.140 Although this Decision seemed like a viable 
solution to the problem, the amendment of the TRIPS has not yet been achieved, since, until 
today, only 45 countries and the EU Members States have supported the TRIPS waiver.141 This is 
only 25 more than in 2009.142 Therefore, the period for acceptances of the Amendment by the 
WTO Members was extended for the third time in 2011, until 31 December 2013.143 The only 
time the system was used was in 2007, in relation to a HIV/AIDS drug TriAvir. Rwanda notified 
the Council for TRIPS in July 2007 of its intentions to import the drug manufactured in Canada 
by a generic pharmaceutical company Apotex Inc.144 After many difficulties145, Canada granted 
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the compulsory licence in October 2007.146 No other member has to date notified Council for 
TRIPS under the 2003 Decision, and only a few members have implemented legislation to enable 
them to issue compulsory licenses in accordance with the waiver.147 The 2003 Decision will be 
discussed in more detail in later Chapters due to its significance for the developing countries. 
2.2.3 EU Law 
As already stated in the introduction, the law that is of relevance for this thesis is mostly 
the international law which is universally applicable. However, due to its progressiveness and 
influence, the law of the EU will be briefly discussed in this sub-section. 
The most important instrument on the EU level is the EPC establishing the European 
Patent Office (EPO), adopted in 1973148 and last revised in 2000.149 It establishes a system of law 
for the grant of European patents for inventions, and its membership extends beyond the 
membership in the EU.150 The main benefit which this Convention provides for the inventors is 
that they can apply for the protection of their invention in a number of countries through a single 
application and a single grant of national patents in the States members of the Convention for a 
period of 20 years, through the EPO. However, under the provisions of the 1973 Convention, 
these patents remained national patents, and it is therefore upon the national institutions to decide 
on matters concerning them, i.e. infringement and enforcement.151 With the amendment in 2000, 
the procedure for the grant of the patent was simplified and a central court system for the 
enforcement of European patents was introduced.152 This document sets the rules on the 
patentability requirements that need to be fulfilled prior to the registration of the patent.153 What 
is also relevant for the area of pharmaceutical patents is that it excludes methods of treatment and 
diagnosis from patentability.154 Finally, as already mentioned in the section concerning the 
patentability requirement of industrial applicability, under the EPC, the term ‘industry’ is referred 
to in a wide sense, thus extending to the pharmaceutical industry.155 
Apart from the EPC, for the purposes of this thesis, the most important documents are the 
Council Regulation No. 953/2003 to avoid trade diversion into the European Union of certain key 
medicines156 and the Regulation No. 816/2006 on compulsory licensing.157 They provide a good 
example on how to balance the needs of all the stakeholders and incorporate the flexibilities 
provided by the TRIPS and subsequent documents mentioned above. On the other hand, the 
Council Regulation 1383/2003 concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing 
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certain IPRs158 is an example of a document that created tensions between the EU and a number 
of countries due to the seizures of generic medicines by EU customs officials.159  
After the adoption of the Doha Declaration in 2001 and the subsequent decisions, the EU 
has tried to balance the patent rights of pharmaceutical companies and the right to access to 
medicines of those living in developing countries facing public health crises.160 The first 
regulation that dealt with this issue was the Regulation No. 953/2003 on tiered pricing of 
medicines and their re-exportation into the EU. In 2001, the Commission adopted a document 
which proposed the establishment of a ‘global tiered pricing system for key pharmaceuticals for 
the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB [tuberculosis] and malaria and related 
diseases for the poorest developing countries’ and to ‘prevent product diversion of these products 
to other markets by ensuring that effective safeguards were in place’.161 A ‘tiered priced product’ 
is defined as any pharmaceutical product used in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the 
aforementioned diseases, which is priced in accordance with one of the optional price 
calculations set in the Regulation162 and afterwards exported to developing countries listed in 
Annex II of the Regulation. The goal of the Regulation is to enable European pharmaceutical 
companies to export cheaper medicines to developing countries without the fear of these 
medicines being imported back to the developed countries under heavily discounted prices.163 
Furthermore, in order to comply with the proposed 2003 Decision, the EU decided to 
implement the decision into its own legislation. In 2006, the European Parliament and Council 
adopted the Regulation No. 816/2006 on compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals for export to 
countries facing public health crises, with the purpose of being ‘part of wider European and 
international action to address public health problems faced by least developed countries and 
other developing countries’ and ‘improve access to affordable medicines which are safe and 
effective ... and whose quality is guaranteed’.164 Similar to the previous Regulation, it stresses the 
importance of medicines manufactured under a compulsory license to reach only those in need 
and not to be diverted from them.165 The countries eligible for the import of the medicines are the 
LDCs that are listed as such in the UN list166, any WTO Member, other than those that renounced 
their rights to use the system, that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its 
intention to use the system, or any non-WTO Member State that appears on the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee's list of 
low-income countries ‘with a gross national product per capita of less than USD 745, and has 
made a notification to the Commission of its intention to use the system as an importer’.167 This 
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Regulation sets out detailed rules on the issuing procedure, conditions of the compulsory license, 
termination of the license, appeals, review and safety and efficacy of medicinal products. 
Finally, a document that sheds an entirely different light to the EU commitments towards 
improving access to medicines is the Council Regulation 1383/2003 concerning customs action 
against goods suspected of infringing certain IPRs, which allows for the ‘detention’ and 
‘suspension release’ of products that are suspected of violating IPRs.168 Since late 2008, the EU 
customs authorities have detained, on numerous occasions, shipments of generic drugs from India 
that were intended for export to other developing countries, because they suspected they were 
counterfeit products.169 India, which was later joined by other countries where generic drug 
manufacturing is widespread,170 has challenged these seizures before the TRIPS Council on the 
grounds that they violate the TRIPS Articles 41 and 51, and on other grounds.171 They have a 
strong standing, since ‘seizing lawfully manufactured generic drugs not intended for “release into 
free circulation” in the EU creates “barriers to legitimate trade” in generic medicines in 
contravention of TRIPS’.172 This case is still ‘in consultation’ stage since 11 May 2010.173 
2.3 Can patent rights be considered as human rights? 
The answer to this often asked question is no. The confusion may be caused by Articles 
27(2) and 15(1(c)) of the UDHR and ICESCR respectively, which provide, in short, that the 
authors of literary, scientific or artistic work have a human right to the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from it. The scopes of these provisions are, however, different 
from the scope of modern-day IP law.174 These provisions provide protection of human rights, 
but they do not protect patents as such.175 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), in its General Comment (GC) No. 17, made a clear distinction between human 
rights on one side and IP rights on the other. The GC provides that human rights are fundamental 
since they are  
inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first 
and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and 
creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as 
well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, 
literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole.176 
Moreover, unlike IP rights, which are temporary in nature, transferable, revocable or 
licensable, human rights are ‘timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human 
person’.177 Therefore, what these Articles protect is the personal link between the author of a 
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scientific production and ‘their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living’, and not their IPRs which extend beyond these moral and 
material interests.178 Furthermore, these provisions are protecting the rights of the inventors as 
individuals, or as group of individuals, and not the entitlements of pharmaceutical companies or 
other businesses which are usually the holders of IP rights and major investors to the R&D of the 
inventions.179 Therefore, as pointed out by Hestermeyer, ‘the ICESCR [or the UDHR] does not 
elevate modern day intellectual property lock, stock and barrel to a human right’.180 
Finally, it should be noted that some regional instruments may serve as a basis for the 
claim that IP rights are in fact human rights181 since they protect IPRs as property rights. 
However, due to the breadth of this topic and the fact that when it comes to access to essential 
medicines, universal human rights instruments are of higher relevance,182 the assessment of 
regional instruments on this particular issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3. The right to health and access to essential 
medicines 
3.1 Introduction to the right to health  
Human rights are inherent to all human beings and are indispensable for living a life in 
dignity. One human right that is of the utmost importance for a dignified life is the right to health, 
since it ensures the full enjoyment of all other human rights and freedoms.183 In other words, 
without the right to health being ensured, all other rights become trivial. The rights that are 
closely related to the right to health are, inter alia, the right to life, food, housing, equality and 
non-discrimination, privacy, work and education.184 Since all human rights are indivisible, 
interrelated and interdependent,185 all of these rights ‘address integral components of the right to 
health’.186 Most countries in the world have ratified at least one international or regional human 
rights document providing for the protection of the human right to health.187 However, not all of 
them are investing enough effort in respecting their obligations under these instruments.  
US President Franklin Roosevelt mentioned the right to health in his ‘four freedoms’ 
speech from 1941. In his speech, he included ‘a healthy peacetime life for [the] inhabitants’ of 
every nation as being a part of the ‘freedom from want’.188 Three years after this famous speech, 
he urged for a document that would include ‘the right to adequate medical care and the 
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health’.189 Although a reference to the right to health 
already existed in the United Nations (UN) Charter,190 the right to health was explicitly defined 
for the first time in the WHO Constitution as a ‘state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.191 Moreover, the Constitution in 
its Preamble stressed that ‘[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of 
the fundamental rights of every human being’ without any distinction whatsoever. Although the 
Preamble of an instrument is not binding upon the States that ratify it, it does serve as a ‘purpose’ 
of the treaty and expresses the motives and goals of the drafters.192 Notwithstanding the legality 
of the Preamble, the definition provided in the WHO Constitution was relied upon by the World 
Health Assembly (WHA), the principal organ of the WHO,193 as well as the academia. Moreover, 
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since the adoption of the Constitution, the right to health has been confirmed in numerous 
international and regional instruments, as well as national constitutions.194 
The first document after the Constitution that had a provision on the right to health was 
the 1948 UDHR, which provided that ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including… medical care’.195 However, 
just as the Preamble is not legally binding, neither is this Declaration since it is a resolution of the 
UN General Assembly, and as such, serves as merely a ‘recommendation’ to States.196 Yet, most 
members of the human rights academia agree that this document has a certain legal effect, and 
even that it has the status of customary international law - forming a part of the ‘International Bill 
of Rights’.197 I agree with this articulation concerning the legality of the UDHR. 
The first ‘truly’ legally binding instrument that provides for the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is the 1966 ICESCR. In its Article 12, it stipulates that the States 
Parties ‘recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’. The drafters of the Covenant decided to narrow down the definition 
of health contained in the WHO Constitution, and instead opted for the notion of the ‘highest 
attainable standard of health’, which pertains not only to the right to health care, but also to ‘a 
wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy 
life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health’.198 However, it should be noted that it 
does not grant to an individual the ‘right to be healthy’,199 but merely the right to the ‘highest 
attainable standard of health’.200 The rationale behind this is obvious, since a State cannot 
provide protection from all causes of illnesses, nor can it ensure good health for all of its citizens. 
Therefore, the right to health under the ICESCR should be understood as ‘a right to the 
enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of 
the highest attainable standard of health’.201 
After the adoption of the Covenant, the right to health has been reiterated in numerous 
instruments, one of the first being the Alma-Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care of 1978, 
which strongly reaffirmed that  
health, which is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity, is a fundamental human right and that the 
attainment of the highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide 
social goal whose realization requires the action of many other social and economic 
sectors in addition to the health sector.202 
The most influential document that followed the adoption of the ICESCR was the GC No. 
14 from 2000,203 drafted by the CESCR, which is referred to on numerous occasions in this 
thesis. Moreover, a very important development regarding the right to health is the appointment 
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of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health (Special Rapporteur). Mr. Paul Hunt was appointed to this 
position by a Resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2002, as an independent 
expert with the mandate to, inter alia, report on the conditions and status of the realization of the 
right to health worldwide and to make recommendations on appropriate measures for the 
realization of the right.204 He has drafted numerous reports on all components of the right to 
health, including essential medicines, neglected diseases as well as the responsibilities of 
pharmaceutical companies, and has drafted the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in relation to access to medicines.205 His successor, Mr. Anand Grover, who took up 
this position in 2008,206 continued this successful and fruitful practice.  
3.2 Essential components and implications stemming from 
the right to health 
Although the protection of the right to health is provided for in numerous international as 
well as national instruments, in practice, it still lacks global recognition which allows it to be 
neglected and systematically violated in ‘too many parts of the world’, especially in developing 
countries.207 This is the case with most of the ESCRs, since they are usually considered as not 
justiciable,208 and therefore ‘less important’ than the civil and political rights. Namely, Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR provides that the State Parties are required ‘to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation’, ‘to the maximum of [their] available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights’ recognized in 
the Covenant. Moreover, in relation to the developing States, the Covenant provides that they 
may ‘determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals’, ‘with due regard to human rights and their national 
economy’.209 This provision is used as a basis for the claims that the ESCRs are not justiciable, 
since there is no certain threshold of the appropriate means and measures that need to be 
implemented in order for a State to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant.210 Moreover, some 
authors stressed that this standard of progressive realization creates ‘a loophole large enough in 
practical terms to nullify the Covenant’s guarantees: the possibility that States will claim lack of 
resources as the reason they have not met their obligations’.211 Hestermeyer rightly pointed out 
that this ‘debate is fraught with misunderstandings stemming from the vagueness of the concept 
of “justiciability” and from inappropriate analogies to national law’.212 Therefore, these claims 
have been rebutted, especially in the light of the Vienna Declaration from 1993 and numerous 
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other instruments establishing the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.213 It is 
certain now that the ESCRs are of the same value as the civil and political rights, and therefore, 
States can no longer escape their obligations stemming from them, basing their failure to comply 
on financial constraints. The reason why the drafters of the Covenant included the provision on 
the progressive realization of the rights is because, as pointed out by Paul Hunt, a 
‘comprehensive, integrated health system’ cannot be constructed overnight,214 and they knew 
they could not impose impossible requirements on States Parties. Thus, Article 12(2) of the 
ICESCR provides that the States Parties need to take steps to achieve the full realization of the 
right to health.  
However, the progressive realization imposes some immediate core obligations upon the 
States, which represent the minimum requirements, as well as the obligations to protect, respect 
and fulfil the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The first immediate obligation 
imposed by the Covenant is the obligation to take concrete, deliberate and targeted steps towards 
the progressive realization of the right to health.215 This obligation also pertains to the obligation 
of the State to ensure the satisfaction of the minimum essential levels of health care and 
determinants of health.216 The Special Rapporteur calls these obligations the ‘minimum “basket” 
of health-related services and facilities’217, others call it the ‘bottom floor from which States 
should endeavour to go up’218, or a ‘survival kit’ necessary for the existence and dignifying life of 
every person.219 Whichever the appropriate name may be, they all include, inter alia, access to 
health facilities, goods and services, minimum essential food and medicines as well as equitable 
distribution to all.220  
The second obligation is that of non-discrimination, meaning that the steps taken should 
be available to all, without discrimination of any kind,221 with the extension that even ‘an 
unintended discriminatory effect may be in breach of international human rights law’.222 These 
obligations have to be fulfilled ‘notwithstanding the financial resources constraints and 
progressive realization’, because ‘otherwise pursuit of the right to health might be constantly 
postponed, emptying the right of any meaning’.223 It is also firmly established that retrogressive 
measures in relation to an already established level of protection of the right to health are not 
allowed, with the exception of extraordinary circumstances, meaning that the State cannot 
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deteriorate the level of its citizens’ right to health it has already achieved.224 Any such measure 
requires ‘the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources’.225  
Like all human rights, the right to health imposes upon States the responsibilities to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right to health of their citizens.226 The obligation to respect requires 
from the States not to interfere with the right to health of their citizens, while the obligation to 
protect entails the implementation and undertaking of measures to prevent third parties from 
interfering and violating the right to health. Finally, the obligation to fulfil includes the 
obligations to facilitate, provide and promote, which requires the States to adopt appropriate 
measures in order to enable the full realization of this right.227 The right to health contains four 
essential elements: the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, 
services and goods (also known as the ‘AAAQ standard’).228 A detailed analysis of these 
components will be provided in the next section in relation to essential medicines. Furthermore, 
in order to decide whether a violation of the right to health has occurred, one should primarily 
distinguish between the inability of the State to comply with its obligations on one side, and its 
unwillingness to adhere to the treaty rules on the other.229 
Additionally, the CESCR and other bodies230 have constantly stressed the importance of 
international cooperation in fulfilling the obligations stemming from the ESCRs. This entails 
both financial and technological assistance, as well as joint efforts in eliminating poverty and 
realizing the full enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health.231 This requires action of 
all relevant actors in the international forum, including NGOs, local communities and private 
businesses, as well as all of the Members of the WTO which undertook this commitment through 
the adoption of the TRIPS and Doha Declaration.232 However, although the ICESCR is today the 
most widely adopted convention on ESCRs with as much as 160 States Parties,233 a persistent 
problem is that more than 30 countries have not ratified it yet, while over 60 countries do not 
provide for the constitutional protection of the right to health to their citizens.234 This unequal 
protection of a fundamental human right indispensable for the enjoyment of all other rights and a 
dignifying life needs to be dealt with the utmost urgency. 
3.3 The right to access to essential medicines: a human right 
Unlike in early medical science, medicines today play an essential role in preventing and 
curing diseases.235 Almost all diseases and illnesses are now preventable or curable through the 
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appropriate combinations of existing medicines.236 Therefore, access to these medicines is a 
necessary component in the course of the full realization of the right to health. Essential 
medicines are defined as ‘those that satisfy the priority health-care needs of the population’, 
which are ‘intended to be available at all times in adequate amounts, in appropriate dosage forms, 
with assured quality, and at a price the individual and the community can afford’.237 ‘Access’ in 
the context of essential medicines was defined by the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) Task Force as ‘having medicines continuously available and affordable at public or 
private health facilities or medicine outlets that are within one hour’s walk from the homes of the 
population.’238 Although it is not explicitly mentioned as an independent human right, the right to 
access to medicines is derived from the human right to health. 
The first indications of recognition of the right to access to essential medicines as a part of 
the right to health were manifested in the second half of the 20th century. The ICESCR implied 
this, in Article 12(2), by stipulating that the steps necessary for the realization of the right to 
health shall include, inter alia, the prevention, treatment and control of diseases and ‘the creation 
of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness’. However, the first document which clearly included access to medicines as a part of 
the right to health was the Alma-Ata Declaration which stated that primary health care includes 
‘at least [...] a provision of essential drugs’.239 A year before that, the WHO issued the first Model 
List of Essential Medicines, and today has issued 17 Model Lists for Adults, and 3 for 
children.240 All doubts on this topic were removed in the CESCR’s GC No. 14, which expressly 
accepted access to essential medicines as an indispensable part of the right to health.241 Since 
then, this has been reiterated in numerous international documents242, and stressed by the Special 
Rapporteur on many occasions.243 
The right to access to essential medicines was also established as forming a part of the 
right to health in a number of national cases. The WHO has conducted a systematic search on 
case-law regarding access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries, and the results 
were that out of 71 court cases from 12 countries, in 59 it was found that access to essential 
medicines, as a part of the right to health, is enforceable through the courts.244 One of the most 
famous cases is the SA case regarding access to ARV drugs. In Minister of Health v. Treatment 
Action Campaign, the Constitutional Court of SA decided that the government has to make an 
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ARV drug called Nevirapine more available and accessible, in order to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV.245 The case was brought against the Minister of Health of SA by a number 
of associations of civil society, because of a programme devised by the Government which 
imposed restrictions to access and availability of the drug in question to the public health sector. 
The second issue in the case was whether the Government is obliged to draft and implement a 
national programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV.246 The Court held that the 
Government must devise and implement a programme aimed to ‘realize progressively the rights 
of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to health services to combat 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV’, and this included counselling, testing, treatment and 
available and accessible drugs to combat this disease.247 Thus, the Court ordered the Government 
to remove all the barriers that denied access to Nevirapine in the public sector, and make it more 
widely available to all.248 This is not the only instance where a national court held that access to 
medicines is a necessary condition in realizing the right to health. For example, in Cruz 
Bermúdez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, the Venezuelan Supreme Court ordered 
the Government to provide access to ARV drugs to all its citizens infected with HIV.249 Also, in 
Edgar Carpio Castro Jofre Mendoza y otros v. Ministry of Health, the Constitutional Court of 
Ecuador found that the decision of the Ministry of Health to stop the supply of ARV treatment 
for people living with HIV/AIDS represents a violation of the right health.250 Therefore, all of the 
above cases clearly establish the right to essential medicines as a human right belonging to a 
wider concept of the right to health.251 
There has also been a discussion on whether the right to access to essential medicines 
could be viewed as being a part of customary international law, either as a component of the right 
to health, or as a part of the right to life.252 The reason for this is the fact that it can be argued that 
there is enough evidence of both the widespread state practice, as well as the opinio juris, which 
entails the belief of States that they are ‘conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation’253, to 
make this claim a viable one. When the right to health and access to medicines is in question, I 
agree with Koskenniemi’s argument that:  
[s]ome norms seem so basic, so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to 
argue that states are legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists 
an agreement between them to that effect, rather than because (…) noncompliance 
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would shock … the conscience of mankind and be contrary to elementary 
considerations of humanity.254 
Apart from the fact that both the right to health and right to life are contained in most of 
the international and national human rights instruments, while the right to life is already 
recognized as forming international customary law255, it could be inferred from the documents 
listed above, as well as constant reminders at the international conferences on the right to health, 
that access to essential itself is paving its path to becoming a part of customary international law, 
if it is not already accepted as belonging to it.  
3.3.1 Essential elements of the right to access to essential medicines 
Before turning to the components of the right to access to life-saving drugs, it should be 
noted that as a human right, access to medicines only pertains to essential medicines within the 
meaning of WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs,256 thereby excluding from human 
rights protection the so-called ‘life-style drugs’. Which medicines will be included in the list of 
essential medicines is a matter of the national policy of each country,257 and the selection depends 
on the particular diseases affecting it as well as the quality, safety, efficacy and costs of the 
medicines.258 However, all States need to bear in mind the WHO Model List of Essential 
Medicines, which is updated every two years,259 and tailor their national lists accordingly. 
The right to access to essential medicines requires from States to respect the 
aforementioned ‘AAAQ standard’ regarding essential medicines.260 Availability of essential 
medicines entails that the essential medicines are available in sufficient quantity to everyone 
within the State. Accessibility means that the medicines need to be accessible to everyone 
without discrimination of any kind. It includes physical accessibility, meaning that medicines 
need to be within safe physical reach for everyone, including the part of the population living in 
rural areas, as well as persons with disabilities. Moreover, accessibility encompasses economic 
accessibility or affordability, which means that medicines need to be affordable to all, including 
socially disadvantaged parts of the population, based on equity, which implies that ‘poorer 
households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer 
households.’ Finally, accessibility comprises accessibility of information, meaning that everyone 
should have equal access to information relating to health issues. However, this accessibility of 
information should not result in an infringement of the confidentiality of personal health records. 
The third element of the right to access to medicines is their acceptability or appropriateness. 
This element requires that all medicines need to be ethically and culturally appropriate as well as 
‘designed to respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned’. Finally, 
essential medicines need to be of good quality and ‘scientifically and medically appropriate’.261 
Hestermeyer points out that these four elements might sometimes conflict each other, since, for 
example, medicine quality may take precedence against the availability or affordability of it.262 
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However, as noted above, since drugs need to pass numerous trial phases, this usually leads to the 
pharmaceutical industry setting higher prices on essential medicines, thereby hampering the 
availability and accessibility of medicines. Notwithstanding this, these trials are incontestably 
required for ensuring of the quality of medicines. The impact of patents and prices set by the 
pharmaceutical industry will be dealt with in the next chapters. Additionally, the WHA has 
identified another four components of access to essential medicines in its Resolution 54.11, 
namely, the rational selection and use of medicines, reliable health and supply systems, 
sustainable financing and affordable prices, and stressed the ‘price sensitivity’ of access to 
medicines.263 
The Working Group of the MDGs has identified six barriers to access to medicines.264 
The first one is the inadequate commitment of States to make healthcare a priority, which usually 
stems from the lack of political will, corruption and the inadequacy of donor programmes and 
international loans. The second obstacle to access to existing medicines is the inadequacy of 
human resources for health, due to inappropriate education, training and access to information 
provided for those working in the health sector. Furthermore, the Working Group stresses that the 
international community has not fulfilled its promises to developing countries in relation to 
improving access to medicines, nor has it provided adequate financing to achieve this. The fourth 
barrier is the fact that ‘persistent lack of coordination of international aid reduces access to 
medicines’. There is a need for transparent and coordinated donor funding at both national and 
international level. The last two barriers are related to the development of new affordable 
medicines necessary for combating widespread epidemics. The Working Group emphasized that 
the TRIPS ‘may block access to affordable new medicines and vaccines’, since after 2005, 
generic production in countries with necessary manufacturing capacities has been subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement, and the subsequent declarations on compulsory licensing are ‘too 
cumbersome for developing countries to exploit’. Finally, the Group also pointed out that ‘the 
current incentive structure is inadequate to promote research and development of medicines and 
vaccines to address priority health problems of developing countries’, especially in relation to 
neglected diseases.265 All of these barriers are a real and dangerous threat to people in need of 
affordable and accessible essential medicines, and States, as well as the international community, 
need to make their overcoming an urgent priority. Moreover, the Working Group, in defining 
accessibility of essential medicines qualified it by stipulating that it applies ‘only to products that 
are effective and of consistently good quality, that have no financial obstacle to a patient 
receiving it, and that have available the knowledge and guidance needed to use them properly’.266 
As for the obligations of States to respect, protect and fulfil the right to access to 
medicines, they receive their full meaning in this domain.267 The responsibility to respect entails 
that the State has to refrain from denying equal access to medicines to everyone, as well as from 
any conduct which would prevent people from accessing life-saving drugs,268 such as preventing 
a group of people from accessing the medicines, while at the same time allowing others to have 
access. This could be done by allowing the private sector to administer a certain essential drug to 
patients, while prohibiting the prescription of the same medicine in the public sector. The 
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obligation to protect requires from the State to prevent others interfering with the right to access 
to medicines through the adoption of laws or other measures in order to ensure access to health 
care and products. This obligation is of great importance in the domain of access to medicines, 
since it is the private pharmaceutical sector that sets the prices and markets the medicines.269 It is 
the duty of the State to make sure that all of its citizens have equal access to affordable medicines 
and, consequently, to ensure a certain amount of essential medicines will always be available 
(physically and economically) to everyone on equal basis, whether through adoption of insurance 
policies or through any other effective measure. Finally, the obligation to fulfil, in relation to 
access to medicines, imposes upon the State the requirement to adopt legislative, budgetary and 
administrative policies regarding essential medicines and to provide the necessary information to 
patients on the existing treatment of diseases.270 
Access to essential medicines has been accepted by the UN, as well as the WHO, as one 
of the primary indicators in assessing the level of the progressive realization of the right to 
health.271 This right depends on numerous conditions, including production, distribution, pricing, 
effective health care system, infrastructure, as well as on the incentives for R&D of medicines.272 
Although it is nowadays uncontested that access to essential medicines forms an indispensable 
part of the right to health,273 only five States expressly recognize this in their legislation.274 This 
lack of legal as well as factual possibilities of access to essential medicines ‘stands as a direct 
contradiction to the fundamental principle of health as a human right’.275 However, as rightly 
pointed out by Hogerzeil,  
[w]hile constitutional recognition of the right to access to essential medicines is an 
important sign of national values and commitment, it is neither a guarantee nor an 
essential step. This is shown by the many countries with failing health systems 
despite good constitutional language, and by those countries with good access to 
essential medicines without it.276 
The next section will present the current obstacles and inequalities that developing 
countries are facing in relation to access to life-saving medicines. 
3.4 Constraints faced by developing countries in relation to 
access to essential medicines 
The right to access to essential medicines has not been realized to the full extent even in 
developed countries. However, it is the developing countries that feel the worst consequences 
stemming from the inequality in access and distribution of life-saving drugs. At least two billion 
people worldwide do not have adequate access to essential medicines,277 and it is even more 
shocking to know that at least forty thousand people die every day, and ten million children every 
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year, as a result of this lack of access, mostly from diseases that are easily prevented and cured, 
such as diarrhoea, respiratory diseases and malnutrition.278 The UN Millennium Declaration 
recognized that developing countries ‘face special difficulties’ in responding to challenges of 
unevenly distributed costs and benefits of globalization.279 This is mostly the result of lack of 
financial resources of both the State and the individuals.280  
The WHO identified three factors critical for securing access to essential medicines- 
sustainable financing, affordable prices, and reliable supply systems, which also implies that 
drugs need to be of good quality, rationally selected and appropriately used.281 The Special 
Rapporteur stressed the great importance of ensuring the good quality of medicines, which 
extends from the State to health workers, since it is important that the medicines are correctly 
prescribed and administered.282 Moreover, it is a common case that medicines rejected in the 
developed part of the world (either because they are unsafe or because their expiry date has 
passed) somehow find their way to the developing countries. This ‘recycling’ of medicines is 
unacceptable. The States have the duty to make sure that these medicines, as well as counterfeited 
ones, do not reach patients, by establishing an effective health system.283 Another major problem 
in developing countries is that because of the lack of insurance policies or bad health care 
systems, the majority of essential medicines are paid ‘out of pocket’, which represents the biggest 
financial burden households in these countries need to bear.284 
One of the MDG Targets, namely Target 8, is to ‘in cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies, provide access to affordable medicines’. The MDG Working Group found that in 
those countries that do provide information on their health systems, the discrepancies between 
public and private sectors are enormous, with availability of essential medicines in the public 
sector being as low as one third, in relation to two thirds in the private sector.285 Moreover, the 
prices for generically manufactured drugs are up to 6.5 times larger than the international 
reference prices.286 It also warned that people who cannot access essential medicines in the public 
sector, will be forced to buy them for much higher prices in the private sector, or decide not to 
treat the illness at all. This is the reason why it urged pharmaceutical companies to start working 
towards improving access to essential medicines through partnerships with governments or 
specially designed programmes intended for the developing part of the world. It presented the 
case of Kenya, which signed an agreement with Novartis on differential pricing, whereby 
Novartis agreed to provide the medicines at lower prices for the public sector in developing 
countries.287 More of these successful arrangements will be presented in the last Chapter.  
Here, one should make a note of the national case-law derived from constitutional 
provisions on access to medicines and the right to health. The case that received the most 
attention is the SA Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association (PMA) case, already mentioned 
in the introduction. The SA President issued a proclamation that was to change the existing 
legislation, making it easier to access essential medicines. Both the US and the pharmaceutical 
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industry opposed this decision, and tried to change it through trade pressures and threats of 
litigation.288 The US decided to cease these trade pressure tactics in 2000, after the public 
embarrassment of Al Gore by HIV/AIDS advocates during his presidential campaign.289 
However, in 2001, 40 pharmaceutical companies (PMA) lodged a case against the Government, 
under the argument that this law breaches SA obligations under the TRIPS.290 After the public 
and the media attention reached worldwide proportions, and they supported the Government’s 
case that the right to health has precedence over private IPRs, the pharmaceutical industry 
withdrew the lawsuit and committed itself to working together with the Republic of SA to further 
the health of its population.291 Another case was against the government of Brazil before of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), lodged by the US, who tried to challenge the Brazilian 
law on compulsory licensing, ensuring better access to HIV/AIDS drugs, which, according to the 
US, violated Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS.292 On 5 July 2001, the parties notified to the DSB a 
mutually satisfactory solution on the matter, and the case was withdrawn. One of the reasons of 
these withdrawals was the fact that the cases, and the potential judgments, posed a risk of 
irreparable reputational damage to the pharmaceutical companies. Even world known magazines 
such as Washington Post and Time have questioned the IP protection of pharmaceuticals in 
developing countries.293 These events turned the attention of the international community to the 
problem of access to essential medicines in developing countries, and a few other cases, already 
mentioned in the previous section, made sure this issue remained on the international agenda.294 
Although there are many barriers to access to essential medicines that need to be 
overcome by the developing countries, the main obstacle, in my opinion, is the one regarding 
pharmaceutical patents and their effect on prices and availability of life-saving drugs, as well as 
lack of incentives for R&D for drugs for neglected diseases. The United Kingdom (UK) 
Government has called this a ‘mismatch between pharmaceutical needs in developing countries 
and the current nature of the global pharmaceutical market’.295 This will be addressed in the 
subsequent Chapter. Moreover, the drafters of the Montreal Statement on Human Right to 
Essential Medicines stressed the importance of international cooperation and assistance, 
emphasizing that providing better access to medicines is in the hands of more affluent countries, 
which ‘must, therefore, ensure fairer trade and investment, eliminate crippling debt, and 
contribute equitably to international assistance aimed at facilitating the full realization of the right 
to essential medicines’.296 On the other hand, all the developing and less affluent countries have 
the shared burden of eliminating poverty and need to implement effective policies in this 
regard.297  
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Notwithstanding the difficulties developing countries face, they also have another, 
completely different role in relation to improving access to medicines. Namely, developing 
countries have played an indispensible role in promoting awareness of the needs of their 
population in both the WHO and WTO.298 This influence can be seen throughout the WTO Doha 
Ministerial Rounds, and the adoption of the Doha Declaration and subsequent decisions, as well 
as numerous WHO declarations and resolutions dealing with the right to health and access to 
medicines, making this issue one of the most pressing today. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter attempted to provide a clear picture on the right to access to essential 
medicines and to ascertain its place in the area of human rights law, as well as to present the 
particular situation in developing countries. Although this is not an easy task, it looks like ‘the 
tide has shifted’ in favour of the human right to essential medicines.299 Many civil society 
movements and NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the Health Action International 
(HAI), the Third World Network and OXFAM, have raised global awareness of the importance 
of adequate access to essential medicines. They have also warned the international community 
about the possible negative implications of international trade agreements on the prices of new 
essential medicines, as well as the lack of incentives for the development of new ones.300 The 
Alma-Ata Declaration stipulated that 
An acceptable level of health for all the people of the world by the year 2000 can be 
attained through a fuller and better use of the world’s resources, a considerable part 
of which is now spent on armaments and military conflicts. A genuine policy of 
independence, peace, detente and disarmament could and should release additional 
resources that could well be devoted to peaceful means and in particular to the 
acceleration of social and economic development of which primary health care, as an 
essential part, should be allotted its proper share.301 
It is now year 2013, and this goal has not yet been reached. However, there are 
considerable efforts made by both the international organizations and NGOs to make this a 
reality. The next suggested timeframe to ‘close the gap between “haves” and “have-nots”’302 and 
achieve better access to essential medicines is now set to the year of 2015.303 
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4. The impact pharmaceutical patents have on the 
right to health 
The areas of IP law and human rights have been addressed separately for a long period of 
time.304 International documents regulating IP law did not have reference to human rights norms, 
and vice-versa.305 This was so until the adoption of the UDHR and the ICESCR which both refer 
to the moral and material interests of the authors.306 After the human rights community noted the 
interplay between the TRIPS and human rights,307 subsequent declarations on the TRIPS, as well 
as numerous declarations on the interdependence of these two areas of law further developed the 
relationship between them. As Helfer eloquently put it, ‘human rights and intellectual property, 
two bodies of law that were once strangers are now becoming increasingly intimate 
bedfellows’.308 
Helfer also points out two approaches to the relationship between these areas of law, the 
first one being the view that these two are in a ‘fundamental conflict’ and the second one seeing 
them as compatible, both dealing with the same fundamental concern of balancing the 
monopolies that give inventors incentives for further work, with the need of the public’s access to 
the inventions, often conflicting with where this balance should be struck.309 On my part, I agree 
with the second approach, but sometimes lean towards the first, especially when it comes to 
neglected diseases. It is my contention that while it is true that patents are needed for future 
incentives for R&D in the pharmaceutical sector, high prices of drugs as well as the direction of 
investment into R&D is in serious conflict with the right to access to medicines in developing 
countries. The reality is that the international patent system has ‘created wealth for as many as it 
has sparked outrage in others’.310 The purpose of this Chapter is to present both sides’ arguments 
and to point to the direction in which the future negotiations should go. The subsequent Chapter 
then presents some concrete solutions. 
4.1 The background and main developments concerning the 
conflict between access to medicines and pharmaceutical 
patents 
 The topic of the conflict between pharmaceutical patents and access to essential 
medicines, as stated before, emerged after the breakthrough discovery of HIV/AIDS medicines 
and their subsequent patent protection. It later intensified after the adoption of the TRIPS. Prior 
to the year 1995, when TRIPS entered into force, national authorities had a certain margin of 
appreciation when it came to adjusting their national IP norms to the socio-economic situation in 
their countries. By providing for the ‘minimal standards’ for IP protection, TRIPS turned the 
previously solely national rules ‘upside down’311 and transferred them to a global level, posing 
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strict rules that need to be obeyed by States in relation to IP regulation, under the threat of 
enforcement and dispute settlement before the WTO bodies. This has, arguably, taken some 
autonomy from the Member States, because the TRIPS provides for the patent protection of all 
forms of technology, thereby not allowing the States to exclude something from patentability, 
like pharmaceuticals for example, which would, in their opinion, improve their development 
prospects.312 
The beginnings of the conflict between access to medicines and pharmaceutical patents 
have been described in the introductory chapter. Hence, I will now only reiterate the main points. 
After the discovery and subsequent patent protection of AZT (a drug that showed effectiveness in 
treating HIV/AIDS) in the 1980s, the NGOs and the public were dissatisfied with the high price 
for the treatment set by the pharmaceutical company owning the patent on the drug. Another 
significant development in the treatment of HIV/AIDS in 1996, namely the discovery of triple-
drug combination therapy that was effective in suppressing HIV/AIDS, known as HAART 
(Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy), brought this issue back into focus of the international 
community. It was stressed that where patients had access to this treatment there was a reduction 
in mortality, while the opposite was the case with those that had no access to the HAART 
regime.313 It was the NGOs such as Oxfam, MSF, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), HAI and 
Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) that first made a connection between pharmaceutical 
patents and access to essential medicines and that warned the international community about the 
drawbacks this conflict will cause, especially in the developing countries.314 1997 was the year 
when the debate started to reach global perspectives. It is the year when the already mentioned 
SA Medicines Act was enacted, which provided that the Minister of health has the power to 
prescribe conditions for the supply of affordable essential medicines in order to protect public 
health, including compulsory licences and parallel imports.315 In 1998, 40 pharmaceutical 
companies decided to sue SA for the alleged violation of the TRIPS and the SA Constitution.316 
This lawsuit turned out to be an ‘unmitigated disaster for the pharmaceutical industry.’317 The 
media coverage was enormous, and the public outrage even bigger, with 300,000 people signing 
a petition for the withdrawal of the lawsuit. Again, NGOs played a crucial role, with TAC joining 
as amicus curiae in the case. Soon everyone was discussing the issue of access to medicines and 
pharmaceutical patents. In the end, due to the unbearable pressure and threat to their reputation, 
the industry decided to withdraw the lawsuit and to work with the Government of SA on the joint 
struggle to improve access to medicines in this country.318 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic may be the biggest, but certainly not the sole example of the 
conflict between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines. Certain other medicines have 
also caused heated debate on this subject, such as Novartis’ cancer medicine Glivec, Gilead’s 
patented medicine against avian influenza called Tamiflu, and in my opinion, the most 
controversial case of the drug called Cipro patented by Bayer. The reason why I find this 
particular case so disturbing is the sudden shift in approach of the US regarding the price of 
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medicines and generic manufacturing. Namely, on 18 September 2001, the US was once again 
under a terrorist attack, and this time biological ‘weapons’ were used. Letters containing a deadly 
poison, Anthrax, were sent to a number of prominent persons in the US, and resulted in five 
deaths.319 Cipro, a drug on which Bayer still had patent protection in the US, was the only 
existing treatment available. After heated negotiations with Bayer, and the threat of purchasing 
the generic version produced by the Indian generic company Cipla, Bayer agreed to drop the 
price from $1.83 to $0.95 per tablet.320 The sudden change of heart on the side of the US, one of 
the main proponents of stringent patent protection, is more than hypocritical. My question is: 
what is the difference between the five people who died in the US, and hundreds of millions of 
people dying every year in the developing world because they lack access to essential medicines? 
Be that as it may, we should move on to the subsequent important developments for this 
topic. Apart from their enrolment in the SA trial, NGOs have constantly stressed the urgency of 
the problem of access to medicines. According to Muzaka, there were three routes used by the 
NGOs to warn the international community of the grave impact the TRIPS had on the right to 
access to medicines.321 Initially, a line of networking went through the WHO and its Revised 
Drug Strategy of 1998, where they made sure that access to medicine was viewed as more 
important than trade.322 This led to the WHA adopting the Resolution 52.19 in 1999, in which it 
noted that ‘that there are trade issues which require a public health perspective’ and urged 
Member States to ‘reaffirm their commitment of developing, implementing and monitoring 
national drug policies and to take all necessary concrete measures in order to ensure equitable 
access to essential drugs’, as well as to ‘ensure that public health interests are paramount in 
pharmaceutical and health policies’.323  
The second route NGOs took was through the WTO and the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, 
which subsequently led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration. This Declaration was viewed as 
a victory for developing countries and NGOs fighting for the prevalence of human rights over 
trade concerns.324 Due to the fact that the TRIPS did not mention the right to health directly, 
although the connection could be inferred from two of its Articles,325 the NGOs tried to reach the 
WTO and put the issue of access to medicines and patents on the Seattle Ministerial Agenda 
through the Amsterdam Statement to WTO Member States on Access to Medicines.326 This 
Statement was adopted at a conference organized by HAI, MSF and CPTech held in November 
1999. The Statement pointed out that the market had failed to provide equitably priced medicines 
and ensure R&D for infectious diseases which are the main cause of 90 per cent of deaths in the 
developing world. Moreover, it stressed that a political action is necessary to address this issue 
and urged for the WTO to address the relation of health and IPRs at the WTO Seattle negotiations 
that were to take place just after this Conference. The WTO was also advised to establish a 
Standing Working Group on Access to Medicines, which would have a task of examining 
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important issues in relation to TRIPS, such as compulsory licensing of patents, exceptions to 
patent rights for the production of medicines intended for export to a country granted a 
compulsory license, assessing the impact of inadequate reviews of patentability standards on 
access to medicines and assessing practical burdens imposed on poor countries when 
administrating patent systems. The drafters of the Statement also urged national governments to 
develop new and innovative approaches to stimulate R&D for neglected diseases.327 As already 
stated, the Seattle negotiations failed and the debate was resumed in Doha, where the final 
Declaration was drafted. Notwithstanding this victory, the subsequent negotiations leading to the 
2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment were mostly led by the developed countries which watered 
down the wording of the Doha Declaration,328 and adopted a solution that is not quite right for the 
developing countries. This was perhaps down to the so-called ‘negotiation fatigue’ the 
developing countries were feeling,329 or the lack of a mutual goal all the developing states agreed 
upon, or possibly something else entirely. The concrete critique on these documents will be 
provided in the next Chapter.  
Finally, the third road taken by the NGOs, as stated by Muzaka, was through human 
rights resolutions and reports adopted from 2000 until today.330 Most were already mentioned in 
Chapter 2, but for the sake of clarity, the most important may be the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, WHA Resolutions 54.11 and 55.14, Human Rights Council Resolution 6/29 
on the Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, Commission on Human Rights’ Resolution 2003/29 on Access to medication in 
the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and the numerous reports 
of the Special Rapporteur. However, the most important progress in this area was made through 
the Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property and Human Rights in which it was noted that 
‘there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in the 
TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other’.331 
4.2 Two sides of the argument: pharmaceutical industry vs. 
human rights activists 
Throughout most of the events described above, the pharmaceutical industry and the 
human rights activists have had entirely opposing views on what the issue was in relation to the 
problem of access to essential medicines in developing countries. This section serves to present 
the main points of discord and contestations of both sides of the dispute. The views of the 
industry are mainly taken from the submissions of officials present at the negotiations 
surrounding the Doha Declaration and subsequent decisions, but they will also be taken from the 
views of some authors that support these arguments. 
The main argument of the industry is that patents in no way present an obstacle for 
developing countries to ensure access to medicines to its citizens. Their view is that health care 
problems existed even before the IP protection on pharmaceutical products was introduced in the 
developing countries.332 Therefore, the promotion of pharmaceutical innovation in the developing 
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world cannot be achieved by undermining the IP system, since most of the problems in access to 
medicines in these countries are unrelated to patents.333 The real obstacle for access to medicines 
according to them is poverty,334 the origin of which are communities where hospitals usually do 
not even exist, where clinics are hours of walk away, and where millions die from diseases which 
are easily treatable, ‘a world of child labour, child mortality and child soldiers, of a massive 
population explosion’, where majority of the people do not have access to health care or cannot 
afford it.335 In the midst of the negotiations following the adoption of the Doha Declaration, a 
number of people from the industry circulated two studies in which they claimed that the real 
barriers for access to medicines in Africa are poverty and limited spending on health care, not 
patents.336 Furthermore, they allege that it is because of the ‘fragility of the health systems’337, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, incorrect assignment of resources and corruption which results in 
poor funding, that people living in developing countries lack access to medicines.338 In order to 
establish a clearer understanding of the industry’s view, I will quote a representative of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s response to the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property’s report, where it defined the barriers to access to medicines: 
We do not believe that the main problem in barring medicines to the poor is patent 
protection, nor do we accept that individual company pricing practices are 
fundamental to explaining why one-third of the world’s poor lack access to basic, 
low-cost essential medicines. An inaccurate and subjective link is forged between 
rights, ‘monopoly’ pricing, and global inequalities in access to medicines... We also 
believe that our private sector research model is worthy of preserving rather than 
abandoning on the risky premise that more public investment will by itself yield 
miracle cures against the complex scientific challenge of fighting resistant strains of 
infectious disease.339 
No one denies the fact that poverty is one of the biggest problems in the developing 
world. But poverty does not erase the impact of patents on access to medicines. On the contrary, 
patents actually exacerbate the already unbearable situation of people living in developing 
countries. As pointed out in the third Chapter, people in these countries usually have to pay for 
the expensive patented medicines out of their own pockets, either because there is no generic 
version of the drug or it is unavailable, thereby requiring persons to expend money which would 
otherwise be used on food, housing and education.340 This leads to malnutrition and inadequate 
living conditions, which then leads back to illness. It is a vicious circle. On a legal note, in 2000, 
the already mentioned Resolution on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights was 
adopted. The drafters of the resolution took a critical approach to the TRIPS and pointed out that 
'actual or potential conflicts exist between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights'.341 Also, the IP standards provided in the 
TRIPS are ‘not necessarily appropriate for countries struggling to meet health and development 
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needs’.342 This is due to their complexity and built-in barriers for export of essential medicines 
through compulsory licensing to countries with no manufacturing capacities.343 The Doha 
Declaration and subsequent decisions did have a positive outcome, but this is still not adequate 
enough to solve the problem of access to medicines caused by pharmaceutical patents. 
The second argument of the pharmaceutical industry is that patent protection on existing 
medicines is of the utmost necessity for future incentives for R&D for new drugs. Only patent 
protection can enable the inventors to recoup their investment into the development of the 
medicines.344 From the trade law perspective, ‘the issues of access to medicines is a clear cut 
matter of patenting of a new chemical product and the process for its use, as well as the 
protection of the patents involved in the markets where the producers intend to sell them’.345 
Patent owners are protected against piracy or any illegal copying of their invention under the 
TRIPS, which provides them with the possibility of taking anyone in breach of the patents before 
the WTO DSB.  
Patents are, without doubt, necessary for the pharmaceutical industry to recoup its 
investment and invest it back into the R&D of other drugs. However, patents are ‘a means, not an 
end’.346 The problem with patents is that they, first and foremost, restrict competition, 
notwithstanding the anti-competition clauses provided in the IP legislation.347 This exclusion of 
generic companies serves the industry as a tool to increase prices of medicines, which then 
excludes poor segments of population from having access to them.348 The need for generic 
competition was stressed in the aforementioned Astra Zeneca case from 2005349, where, although 
the European Court did agree on the importance of strong IP protection so the industry can regain 
their investments, it also stated that ‘competition from generic products after a patent has expired 
itself encourages innovation in pharmaceuticals’.350 The second problem with the stringent patent 
protection sought by the industry is that patents artificially inflate prices of medicines for a period 
of 20 years to allow the industry to maximize their revenues, which could be viewed as 
acceptable for the developed part of the world, where insurance regimes work, and public has, in 
general, access to essential medicines.351 The situation in developing countries is entirely 
different. Here, prices do matter.352 Pogge claims that ‘allowing firms to make up for the costs of 
research’ has the ‘morally perverse effect on raising the prices of pharmaceuticals to a level 
where they become unaffordable to the poor’.353 Muzaka stresses the philosophical, economic 
and moral unjustifiableness of the situation where a selected few individuals are granted the 
‘privilege of harnessing most or all of the market value’ for an invention, ‘without guaranteeing 
that society at large has access to it on reasonable and affordable terms.’354 People living in 
poverty cannot afford high priced medicines, so most of the diseases effectively amount to a 
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‘death sentence’ for them, despite the fact that effective treatments do exist.355 People suffering 
from these diseases then often risk their economic security by buying these expensive drugs, and 
they mostly buy them instead of food, housing and education.356 Therefore, the WHO contends 
that Member States need to use the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS and ensure equitable 
access to medicines for all without discrimination of any kind.357 
To this argument of the human rights proponents, the industry and those supporting its 
claim stipulate that, again, patents cannot be a barrier to access to medicines or to the generic 
competition, since only an insignificant number of medicines from the WHO Model List are in 
fact patentable.358 David Earnshaw from SmithKline Beecham phrased his views like this:  
It is [also] claimed that relaxing patent law through a TRIPS review will 
miraculously promote equitable access to health care. It is difficult to understand 
why patents are seen as being such a problem. In reality, about ten of the 300 or so 
medicines on the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs are still under patent and, of 
these, all but one will be off patent within the next three years. If TRIPS is such a 
problem, and patents the root — or even sole — cause of the access problem, people 
in developing countries should today have unlimited and unhindered access to almost 
all the generic drugs on the WHO Model List. In practice, patents can be seen as 
creating a burden-sharing mechanism between rich and poor. Funding for research 
and development comes from current revenue derived principally from patented 
products. In reality, institutions and companies in the rich countries of the northern 
hemisphere carry the burden of paying for pharmaceutical innovation with the USA 
and Europe paying for probably 80% of innovation. I do not think anyone would 
seriously want that to change.359 
The industry further claims that it has invested into the R&D at least three times more 
than telecommunications industry, four times more than the defence and all other industries, that 
without the productions of the research-based pharmaceutical companies there would be no 
medicines for HIV/AIDS, nor the improvements on existing medicines for which there has grown 
a resistance.360 
Be that as it may, what about the R&D priority setting in the pharmaceutical industry? 
Here it should be stressed that, although pharmaceutical patents do stimulate R&D and discovery 
of new drugs, most of these incentives are directed towards diseases that are profitable for the 
industry. This neglect for the ‘unprofitable diseases’ mostly affecting the poor, together with the 
fact that most drugs are priced beyond the financial abilities of people living in developing 
countries, creates the so-called ‘global drug gap’.361 The WHO has expressed its ‘increasing 
concern’ for the fact that R&D in the pharmaceutical industry ‘follows industrialized countries’ 
market demands’, and that tropical diseases and diseases affecting mostly the developing part of 
the world are neglected.362 The crux of this problem, according to the industry, lies elsewhere. 
Most of the diseases that affect the poor can be treated with already available resources, if they 
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are combined properly, and the only barrier is the allocation and division of the medicines to 
people who need them.363 Yet this does not explain the phenomenon of neglected diseases for 
which there is no treatment available, not even a combination of already existing drugs. Also, 
there is now a high prevalence of Multi-Drug Resistant (MDR) Tuberculosis, which is rapidly 
spreading through Eastern-Europe364, already having spread through Africa and other developing 
parts of the world, and it is just a matter of time as to when it will reach the Western-European 
states365, as was the case with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, 
which in a very short time spread from the Southern China to the rest of the world.366  
The already available treatment for MDR-Tuberculosis does not work, because, as the 
name says, it has become resistant to the existing medicines. Also, it should be mentioned that 
the pharmaceutical industry has a widespread practice of patenting the so-called ‘me too’ drugs, 
also known as copycat drugs, which are basically a new drug, but very similar to one or more 
already existing drugs.367 They are new in a way that they differ from the previous version of the 
medicine just enough to be considered novel for the purposes of patent protection.368 They do not 
bring additional clinical benefits and ‘they lack innovation compared with existing therapeutic 
options’.369 They are usually used to extend patent protection for those drugs that are nearing the 
end of the 20 years protection. ‘Me too’ drugs need to pass all the stages of the R&D as the 
previous version of the drug, so the industry needs to invest a great amount of money into its 
development, thereby ‘divert[ing] R&D investment away from diseases with higher unmet 
needs’.370 They are usually priced the same or at a higher price as the drug that is already 
available on the market.371 Muzaka also criticizes the fact that apart from their investments into 
the costly R&D process, the companies also spend considerable amounts on legal disputes over 
these drug modifications that are very frequent nowadays.372 This money could be invested into 
research for new medicines for neglected diseases, but the ‘me-too’ drugs are apparently more 
profitable for the industry. 
Finally, as for the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS, particularly the compulsory 
licensing, none of the actors in this dispute agree that they are a perfect solution to the problem. 
The industry claims that the new regime provided by the 2003 Decision goes beyond the scope of 
the TRIPS, and against the interest of the companies, which is unacceptable.373 On the other side, 
the human rights activists claim it is too burdensome and inapplicable in real life.374 The industry 
is mostly concerned about the generic competition coming from India and other developing 
countries with developed generic industry, since, according to them, the paragraph 6 system 
makes it too easy for these countries to export the generic drugs, thereby lowering the profit of 
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the industry.375 Moreover, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations’ (IFPMA) position on compulsory licensing is that ‘[c]ompulsory licensing is a 
threat to good public health by denying patients around the world the future benefits of R&D 
capabilities of the research-based industry from which new therapies come’.376 Their flaws aside, 
the rules on compulsory licensing as provided by the Doha Declaration and subsequent decisions 
are necessary for ensuring access to essential medicines. TRIPS had many obstacles in its 
compulsory licences regime, which most harshly affected the developing countries without 
manufacturing capacities. Something had to be changed, and the 2003 Decision provided this 
change. As rightly noted by ‘t Hoen, ‘[t]he very fact that public health and access to medicines 
have been singled out as major issues needing special attention in TRIPS implementation 
indicates that health care and health care products need to be treated differently from other 
products.’377 Another attempt by the industry to prevent the adoption of 2003 Decision was the 
claim that developing countries with manufacturing capacities, such as India and Brazil, would 
use the system to promote the export of ‘lifestyle’ drugs. However, it can be inferred from the 
texts of both the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision that these drugs are not covered by 
these documents, since they do not fall under the ‘essential medicines’ category, nor can hair loss 
or impotence be considered as ‘public health crises’.378 During the negotiations, the developing 
countries suggested the inclusion of a negative provision ensuring that these drugs do not fall 
under the system, but the proposal was not adopted.379 More on compulsory licenses will be 
written in the subsequent chapter. 
As can be seen from this section, this is a never-ending battle of arguments, they all have 
standing, but this standing can be easily lost. It is a matter of perspective. In the developed part of 
the world, patents are indispensable; they are of the utmost necessity for the discovery and 
production of new medicines, without which fighting diseases would be impossible. However, 
the situation in developing countries is completely different. The UN, the WHO and many other 
organizations have expressed their concerns about the TRIPS’ ‘one size fits all’ approach to IP 
protection.380 This could be bypassed with the appropriate use of TRIPS flexibilities (which are 
not the perfect solution, but are still a solution). However, many developed countries simply do 
not allow others to use these flexibilities in their full extent, mostly through the ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
FTAs and through numerous judicial disputes whenever a country wants to implement these into 
its legislation. The situation in developing countries needs special attention from the international 
community. The next section will explain why. 
4.3 The specific problems faced by the developing countries 
in relation to access to essential medicines 
The population of developing countries reached 4.8 billion in 2008, which represents 80% 
of the world’s population, and is rapidly growing each year.381 Out of these 4.8 billion people, 
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almost 2 billion do not have access to essential medicines.382 More than 10 million people die 
each year from infectious diseases, and 90 per cent of these deaths occur in the developing 
countries. The high prices of medicines generated by stringent patent protection, along with the 
pressures exerted by industrialized countries and pharmaceutical companies on those developing 
countries that try to improve access to medicines for their populations, provide no help in 
alleviating these sufferings.383 This pressure is usually manifested through legal disputes 
concerning legislation that is designed to improve access to medicines, as was the case with the 
SA and Brazilian disputes already mentioned, and FTAs, which usually include the ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
provisions that strengthen IP protection even more.384 To make things worse, although the burden 
of the diseases in developing countries rises up to 90 per cent, only 10 per cent of global R&D is 
invested into the diseases that affect the poor. This is called the 90/10 gap.385 Barriers to access to 
medicines in developing countries are numerous, from underdeveloped health care systems, 
through corruption and poverty in general, as shown in the previous section, but high prices of 
medicines generated by patents and the course in which the R&D for new drugs is directed 
remain the biggest ones.  
The TRIPS, by imposing the minimum standards of IP protection, has worsened the 
situation in developing countries, which, before the adoption of the Agreement, have not 
provided for patent protection of pharmaceuticals. The territorial limitation for compulsory 
licensing provided by the TRIPS made it impossible for countries without manufacturing 
capacities to import cheap versions of medicines through this flexibility. Concerns were raised 
about the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the TRIPS, since it ‘leads to unjust and burdensome 
outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet the most basic needs of their citizens’.386 In 
this regard, the Doha Declaration and subsequent decisions present a crucial development for the 
developing countries. Although the system has been used only once so far (in 2007 by Rwanda 
and Canada), the fact that the territorial barrier was overcome and the goal of providing a 
possibility for accessing cheaper medicines has been reached, at least on paper, shows the 
readiness of the international community to tackle the problems developing world is facing.387 
The Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO from 2004 stressed that ‘[d]eveloping countries 
must have the tools to implement the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and 
“use, to the full” the flexibilities in the TRIPS to “promote access to medicines for all”.388 
However, in 2005, India, the biggest generic producer of medicines, had to introduce patents on 
pharmaceuticals, which has resulted in the unavailability of cheap generic versions of newly 
discovered medicines necessary for the treatment of most infectious diseases affecting developing 
countries.389 Recently, at the opening session of the UN Economic and Social Council in 2007, 
the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, stated that ‘[t]he rules of intellectual property 
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rights need to be reformed, so as to strengthen technological progress and to ensure that the poor 
have better access to new technologies and products.’390 The Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) stated that:  
[i]n the developing world, where the market has very limited purchasing power, as is 
the case for diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing countries, 
patents are not a relevant factor or effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new 
products to market. Moreover, because most poor people in developing countries 
have to meet the cost of treatments from their own very limited disposable income, 
in contrast to people in most developed countries where governments and private or 
government insurance schemes play a major role, any impact that patents or indeed 
other policies may have on prices paid need to be carefully considered.391 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic represents one of the greatest challenges for the developing 
countries. In 2011, 34 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, and 1.7 million people, both 
adults and children, died from it. Most of these people live in the developing world.392 HIV/AIDS 
not only takes lives, but it also affects all aspects of development. Households with members 
affected with this disease suffer from a decrease in income, children are being brought up without 
parental support, without the possibility to pursue education due to the high costs of the 
treatment, and it is said that this disease might ‘push additional 6 million households into poverty 
by 2015’ unless something is done to address the problem.393 Moreover, all public sectors, such 
as agriculture, business and education, are affected due to the lack of workers and lower 
productivity.394 All the while, the prices of the medicines necessary for the treatment of this 
disease serve to make them unavailable and unaffordable for most of those affected.395 In recent 
years, the awareness of the international community of the sufferings of people living with 
HIV/AIDS has grown considerably, and there now exist numerous international organizations 
and NGOs that are addressing this issue. The most important organizations that are helping fight 
this disease on a global level are the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the WHO, which has a 
Department on HIV/AIDS.396 Alongside regional and national NGOs that are fighting for the 
same cause, they have invested considerable effort and funding into helping get the problem 
solved and improving the lives of those living with HIV/AIDS. We can now say that, although at 
the beginning HIV/AIDS was considered as a neglected disease, today it has attracted numerous 
investments for R&D of medicines397 and there now exists a necessary treatment for this deadly 
disease. However, as already pointed out in this thesis, the fact that the medicines are available 
does not necessarily mean that they are accessible to everyone. Although the number of people 
affected with HIV/AIDS in developing countries is constantly rising, most of these people are not 
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receiving adequate treatment.398 It is both due to patent protection and consequent high prices of 
these medicines, together with their bad disposition, that they remain unavailable for the poor.  
Two more issues are particularly affecting the developing countries, namely the problem 
with neglected diseases and counterfeit drugs. The next sections will address these problems. 
4.3.1 Neglected diseases 
A major problem in the developing countries is the issue of neglected diseases. Here, the 
impact of pharmaceutical patents monopolies, or more precisely, the direction of R&D for new 
drugs, is the most visible. Unlike the ‘usual’ lack of essential medicines, in the case of neglected 
diseases, there are no drugs that are to be accessed.399 The reason for this is that only 10 per cent 
of pharmaceutical R&D is focused on developing drugs for diseases that affect 90 per cent of the 
global burden of disease, the so-called ‘10/90 gap’.400 Medicines for these diseases are simply of 
very little interest for the industry, since it cannot gain enough profit from their sales, or recoup 
the investments made into their discovery and development. It is so because the market for these 
medicines is either too small or too poor.401 The updated statistics show that out of 1556 new 
drugs developed from 1974 to 2004, only around 1% (10 drugs) was specifically indicated for 
neglected diseases.402 
Neglected diseases can be defined as those diseases for which there are no adequate, 
effective or any means at all to prevent, diagnose or cure them.403 Also known as tropical or 
poverty-related diseases, they affect mostly the poor, living in low-income countries, especially 
in rural areas.404 They belong to the Type II (neglected) diseases which are ‘incident in both rich 
and poor countries, but with a substantial proportion of the cases in poor countries’ and Type III 
(very neglected) diseases, which are ‘overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing 
countries’405, and include, inter alia, Chagas disease, leprosy, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis (river 
blindness), African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and dengue.406 The WHO has drafted a 
non-exhaustive list of about 14 diseases that fall within this group in 2007407, and today this list 
includes a total of 17 diseases.408 Until recently, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis have also 
been included as Type II diseases. However, since they now attract considerable attention and 
investments from various actors, they are not considered as neglected as other tropical diseases, 
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although a certain degree of effort is still needed in developing countries to enable access to 
medicines for these diseases as well.409  
Neglected diseases share seven common features according to the WHO: they are a 
‘proxy for poverty and disadvantage’; they ‘affect populations with low visibility and little 
political voice’; they do not spread to the high-income countries since they are climate bound; 
they cause stigma and discrimination, especially among the most vulnerable members of the 
society; they have an important impact on morbidity and mortality; and are relatively neglected 
by research.410 From a human rights standpoint, these diseases are both the cause and the 
consequence of human rights violations.411 Looking at them from the consequence perspective, 
we can see that they mostly appear in countries where human rights are systemically violated, 
where people are usually denied their basic human rights to health, housing, water, education and 
participation.412 From the cause perspective, people living with these diseases are subjected to 
discrimination in the everyday aspects of life such as work, privacy, education and enjoyment of 
the benefits of scientific progress, apart from the obvious violations of the rights to life and 
health.413 In developing countries, some neglected diseases such as leishmaniasis and leprosy are 
‘a source of fears, stereotypes and prejudices’, mostly because these diseases cause severe 
changes in physical appearance as well as disabilities.414 The special needs of vulnerable and 
high-risk groups were addressed at the Alma-Ata Conference, where it was recommended that 
high priority in health care should be given to people belonging to these groups.415  
As noted above, the direction which pharmaceutical innovation is taking is towards the 
development of medicines for diseases that are ‘profitable’ and thus are a secure investment for 
the industry. The pharmaceutical industry directs its investments ‘where money can be made with 
sufficient probability’ and what is really attractive and profitable are the so-called ‘life-style 
drugs’ for impotence, hair loss, obesity and other non-communicable and non-life-threatening 
diseases.416 Sometimes, even when medicines for neglected diseases are developed or are at the 
final stage of development, they may not go to the stage of production if they are not considered 
profitable.417 The major pharmaceutical companies are situated in the US, Germany, Japan and 
Switzerland and they derive 80 per cent of their profits from sales in these countries. Linked to 
this, these countries earn considerable amounts of money from rents paid by the manufacturers 
for the exploitation of pharmaceutical patents. The money earned by both of these actors can be 
used to cover the existing R&D costs as well as promotion of future R&D for medicines for 
neglected diseases.418 This was also affirmed by the Special Rapporteur, who stressed that ‘[i]n 
the field of essential medicines, states have a responsibility to ensure that patent protections of 
pharmaceutical products do not make these medicines inaccessible, on account of high prices 
charged by pharmaceutical companies’ and recommended that they could fund and provide 
                                                 
409 Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies (n382), Preamble (r); Stirner (n402), p. 392, footnote 4. 
410 WHO, ‘Global Plan to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases, 2008-2015’ (n407), p. 5; See also Hunt (n401) , p. 4; 
Stirner (n402), pp. 393-4; Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Medicines Paper (n399), p. 16. 
411 Hunt (n250), p. 3. 
412 Ibid, pp. 1 and 3. 
413 Ibid, p. 3; Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Medicines Paper (n399), p. 17. 
414 Hunt (n250), pp. 23-4. 
415 Alma-Ata Declaration (n202), Recommendation 8. 
416 Hestermeyer (n1), pp. 160 and 162; J. Drews, ‘Drug Research: Between Ethical Demands and Economic 
Constraints’, in M. A. Santoro and T. M. Gorrie (eds.), Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry (2005) CUP at 21, p. 
28. 
417 UN Millennium Project 2005 (n236), p. 61. 
418 Abbott (n360), p. 324; Hestermeyer (n1), pp. 161-2. 
47 
 
 
 
incentives for R&D for both the public and private sector through tax credits, patents, 
subventions and grants.419 As for the pharmaceutical industry, in his Human Rights Guidelines 
for Pharmaceutical Companies, he advised the companies to ‘make a public commitment’ to 
contribute to R&D for neglected diseases and to either provide ‘in-house’ R&D for these 
diseases, or support ‘external’ R&D for them, or both.420 Furthermore, he noted that they should 
consult with the WHO, the WHA and other leading international organizations and initiatives in 
order to improve their contribution to R&D, which should be publicly disclosed.421 
The Special Rapporteur finally noted that ‘[t]here is no “universal checklist” of who is 
vulnerable in a given society’422, and Pogge stressed the special status of pharmaceutical patents 
and their relation with neglected diseases by saying that:  
[i]t may be acceptable that no one is developing software demanded only by a few 
and that no one is producing music valued only by the very poor. But it is morally 
problematic that few treatments are developed for rare diseases, and it is extremely 
problematic, morally, that so few treatments are developed for medical conditions 
that cause most of the premature deaths and suffering in the world today.423 
Today, even though they are climate-bound, the diseases that only affect the poor can be 
easily transmitted to the developed part of the world and because of the neglect of the needs of 
people affected by these diseases, the developed world will be caught unprepared for tackling 
them.424 As we have seen from the Anthrax scare in the US, the developed world quickly changes 
its position when its own populations are at stake. Perhaps the fact that their own populations 
may one day require medicines for combating tropical diseases could engender a change in 
perspective and make them invest more into the R&D for tropical diseases. When all the stages of 
R&D are complete, and the medicines are available, the matter of their accessibility in 
developing countries could be tackled with fewer difficulties. 
4.3.2 Counterfeit Drugs 
Although there exist numerous definitions of counterfeit drugs, the WHO defines them as 
those that are ‘deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or source’.425 
Counterfeit drugs ‘may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong 
ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake 
packaging’.426  
Apart from neglected diseases, the issue of counterfeit drugs presents one of the biggest 
problems the developing countries are facing. Poverty, lack of essential medicines and their high 
prices are the main reasons why the production of counterfeit drugs has proliferated in 
developing countries, and why the availability of these drugs has ‘reached a disturbing 
proportion.’427 As previously stated, in addition to being made readily available, affordable and 
accessible, essential medicines must be of good quality and safe for the patient.428 Counterfeit 
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drugs do not meet any of those conditions. These drugs present an immense threat to the lives and 
health of those who purchase and use them.  
Apart from these dangers, the use of poor quality medicines may result in loss of work 
and income because of death of a family member, disability or extended duration of the 
disease.429 Moreover, these drugs also contribute to the development of resistance to anti-
infectives and waste the already scarce resources of people living in developing countries.430 The 
WHO Medicines Strategy 2008-2013 stressed that, although it is impossible to give exact 
information on the extent of the problem with counterfeit drugs, the number of cases where 
counterfeit drugs were involved in 2007 has increased to over 1500, which is more than four 
cases each day.431 However, the true prevalence of the problem is still unknown, because, 
according to the WHO, no global action has been conducted yet.432  
The reasons why counterfeit drugs find their way into the markets of both developed and 
developing countries are numerous, extending from the unwillingness of states to investigate and 
punish those who commit this crime, corruption, absence of or weak drug regulation, to lack of 
appropriate drug legislation.433 However, the WHO has identified one more reason which is of 
importance for this thesis. Namely, it has identified high drug prices as one of the factors that 
encourage drug counterfeiting.434 Because drug prices are high, people, in developing countries 
especially, will seek for a cheaper variant if it is available on the market, without thinking of the 
consequences. Due to the sheer scale of the problem, the WHO has decided to launch the 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (IMPACT) in 2006, comprised of 
all the major actors concerned, including NGOs and associations representing pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, with the aim of putting an end to counterfeiting medical products around the 
world.435 
Besides the devastating impact on the right to life and health of people, counterfeit drugs 
also have an impact on the pharmaceutical industry. Because of the similarities in packaging and 
labelling, these drugs are usually associated with the real manufacturer and that puts the 
industry’s reputation at risk. Not only will patients lose the confidence in the original medicines 
from the manufacturer whose drugs have been counterfeited, but the industry may also face 
litigation where it has to prove it had nothing to do with the counterfeiting. Therefore, the 
industry needs to work with the states to combat the problem of counterfeit drugs, for its own 
sake and for the sake of people using their products. 
The CIPIH Report has noted that there is ‘growing awareness of the problem posed by 
counterfeit medicines, although the full extent is not well understood because of a lack of 
data’.436 The WHO has identified a number of routes that need to be taken to combat counterfeit 
medicines, both on the national and international levels. They mainly consist of enactment of 
appropriate drug legislations, training personnel for national drug control, making judicial action 
more effective in processing cases of counterfeit drugs and spreading awareness of the problem 
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to the general public.437 Finally, the WHO has adopted Guidelines for the development of 
measures to combat counterfeit drugs in 1999, which are to be referred to in order to effectively 
combat counterfeiting of medicines.438 
4.4 Conclusion 
As can be seen from this Chapter, there are many obstacles to access to medicines in the 
developing countries other than patents439, and although most of the medicines needed to cure 
diseases in the LDCs are not under patent protection440, patents remain the biggest reasons why 
prices of medicines are artificially inflated and the main barrier to access to medicines. Moreover, 
these countries are not affected only by the ‘diseases of the poor’, but also by cancer, diabetes, 
cardiovascular diseases, asthma which also cause unbearable suffering and deaths, and ‘newer, 
more effective treatments for these conditions are often patented and will be patented in the 
future’.441 As Bill Gates said to the WHA in 2005:  
Political systems in rich countries work well to fuel research and fund health care 
delivery, but only for their own citizens. The market works well in driving the 
private sector to conduct research and deliver interventions, but only for people who 
can pay. Unfortunately, the political and market conditions that drive high quality 
health care in the developed world are almost entirely absent in the rest of the world. 
We have to make these forces work better for the world’s poorest people.442 
The world needs a coordinated action from all the relevant actors in order to improve 
access to safe and affordable essential medicines for all. 
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5. Finding balance and possible solutions  
One might ask whether a balance between the right to health and pharmaceutical patents 
should be sought at all. If the right to health is a fundamental human right necessary for the 
enjoyment of all other human rights, do we really need to balance it against other ‘trivial’ and 
less important trade norms? The answer is yes. Although the right to health is of the utmost 
importance, it still has to make some way for the innovators to protect their viable interests in the 
form of patented medicines and through them, their livelihood. Of course, this balance has to be 
carefully assessed. The pharmaceutical industry, with a few exceptions, has so far been, in my 
opinion, too greedy in trying to make the patent protection even more stringent, no matter the 
costs. This is in contradiction with the TRIPS, which they consider their most powerful weapon 
in pursuing their profit-driven interests. Namely, as already stated, even the TRIPS in its Article 7 
stresses the need of balancing the needs of producers and users of technological knowledge, ‘in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare’, while Article 8 allows Member States to 
‘adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition’.443  
However, this never-ending battle is far from lost. Apart for the existing solutions to the 
problem, some of course better than others (some proposed by the WTO itself), we can see the 
emergence of possible solutions proposed by distinguished scholars who have invested their time, 
effort and knowledge into conceptualizing them. Moreover, there already exist some examples of 
‘good practices’ conducted by large pharmaceutical companies in collaboration with NGOs and 
PPPs, which are doing a great job in enabling better access to medicines. Whether these proposed 
solutions will get the chance to be materialized and become a reality for those who desperately 
need a long-term solution remains to be decided by the international community. I will now 
present some of the solutions that are most likely to succeed, while at the same time providing 
some critique on the existing ones. 
5.1 Existing solutions 
This section provides an insight into some existing solutions for the resolution of the 
pharmaceutical patents-access to medicines conflict. Some of these are praised as great solutions, 
while others are unfairly set aside because they do not support the interests of the high-profile 
players, although they are of same quality, if not better. I will start with the solution that acquired 
the most attention from the international community, namely the TRIPS flexibilities in the form 
of compulsory licenses and the Article 30 solution (which was neither upheld nor declined). Then 
I will proceed with the generic industry alternative, which is not acceptable for the industry, at 
least not during the term of patent protection. 
5.1.1 Article 30 solution and compulsory licensing- the TRIPS 
flexibilities 
The TRIPS, as already noted, provides for the minimum standard of IP protection that is 
obligatory for all Member States. Although in a couple of Articles it does take into account 
certain aspects that could be viewed as reference to human rights444, it cannot be said that it 
‘takes a human right approach to intellectual property protection’, but that it is trying to strike a 
balance between these sets of rights.445 If it succeeded then it would become another issue 
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altogether. Even though it provides for certain flexibilities in its implementation, one cannot 
overlook the fact that it only speaks of IP rights, and in very much detail, but only ‘alludes’ to the 
responsibilities of the right bearers.446  
Notwithstanding this criticism, the TRIPS, together with the subsequent declarations on 
compulsory licensing does provide for flexibilities that can and should be used by developing 
countries. I will here present two such flexibilities, namely the ones provided in Articles 30 and 
31 of the Agreement, along with a few remarks on the actual prospect of their implementation in 
practice.  
5.1.1.1 Article 30 Solution 
Article 30 of the TRIPS provides for exceptions to the rights conferred upon the patent 
holder, and stipulates that 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
There is no official interpretation of what these limited exceptions may be, but many 
propositions have been given during the negotiations leading to the 2003 Decision. A number of 
NGOs have campaigned for an Article 30 solution to the ‘Paragraph 6’ problem. Their view of 
this solution was that it was administratively simple, workable and economically viable.447 This 
was also upheld by the WHO and many developing countries because it would be much easier for 
the exporting country not to go through the burdensome compulsory licence procedure if the 
medicines were not patented in the importing country. However, if the patent existed in the 
country of destination, then the compulsory licensing system would apply.448 
Article 30 provides for limited exceptions which apply without the authorization of the 
patent holder, which is deducted from the title of Article 31.449 This Article provides for at least 
two kinds of exemptions: the ‘research exemption’, which allows researchers to use the patented 
invention for further research, and the ‘regulatory exception’, which allows generic 
manufacturers to use the patented invention to obtain the necessary marketing approval without 
the permission of the patent holder, before the patent protection expires.450 This solution would, 
therefore, authorize generic companies to produce and export patented medicines to the LDCs 
affected by a public health crisis, thereby circumventing the patent protection of the medicines in 
the exporting country.451 The use of Article 30 exceptions was addressed in the Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products dispute452, where the DSU Panel adopted a very narrow 
definition of ‘limited exceptions’.453 This was criticized by Hestermeyer who said that the Panel 
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should not have used the ‘dictionary definition of “limited” as “confined within limits”’, but 
‘taking account of both Articles 7, 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and the right to access to medicine, 
[should have] allowed exceptions that are narrowly tailored to achieve the purposes laid down in 
Articles 7 and 8’.454 Be that as it may, due to the vague wording of the Article and the 
interpretation of the Panel, this solution was not upheld at the negotiations. From the perspective 
of the patent holders, this solution was simply not acceptable as it did not provide ‘adequate 
procedural safeguards or respect for the patent holder interests’.455 This was maintained by the 
developed countries where most of the industry is based, so that, in the end, an Article 31 
approach was adopted, while at the same time, nothing was said about relinquishing the use of 
Article 30 flexibilities if needed, for exports to the non-WTO Members, which were not covered 
in the final Decision.456 
5.1.1.2 Compulsory licensing 
Another flexibility provided by the TRIPS is the possibility of compulsory licensing 
stipulated in Article 31. As already mentioned, due to a territorial barrier in paragraph F of the 
Article, negotiations were held in 2001, which resulted in the adoption of the Doha Declaration. 
The Declaration recognized in paragraph 6 that the members with no manufacturing capacities 
could face difficulties in using the flexibility provided in Article 31, and called for the Council 
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to the problem no later than the end of 2002. The result 
proved to be not ‘expeditious’ at all457 and only partly a solution.458 
The Council for TRIPS did break the time frame provided in the Doha Declaration, but a 
‘paragraph 6’ decision was adopted in 2003. Unlike the Doha Declaration, which was praised as a 
victory of the developing countries, the 2003 Decision was a watered down solution that 
benefited the needs of the industry.459 At first glance, the Decision seems like a legitimate 
solution to the problem posed by the paragraph F. But if one examines in more detail the 
provisions of the Decision, he will encounter quite a few obstacles and difficulties which 
Member states will face when trying to implement this system in practice.460  
First and foremost, the procedure for granting the license is too burdensome and 
complicated for both the exporting and importing countries.461 The exporting country needs to 
issue a compulsory license in order to export the medicines to the importing country facing a 
public health crisis. If, however, the drug is patented in the importing country as well, the 
importing member has to issue a second compulsory licence.462 The requirements that need to be 
met by both the importing and exporting country are enumerated in paragraph 2 of the 2003 
Decision, which is attached to the thesis. However, one problem appears to be the most 
burdensome, and that is the fact that the whole system is based on a ‘drug-by-drug, country-by-
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country and case-by-case decision-making’463, and the Decision does not take into account the 
uncertainty of most of the health crises. It is overly complicated for both the importing and 
exporting country to repeat the whole process again, when, for example, the designated amount 
of medicines produced under the licence, proves to be insufficient.464 
Furthermore, some States and NGOs have expressed their concerns about the ‘scope of 
the diseases’ covered by both the Declaration and the 2003 Decision, because it states that it 
recognizes ‘the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-
developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics’.465 Abbott pointed out this problem, saying that this may be seen as limiting the 
‘scope of the disease’ covered by the documents and that there was no reason for the drafters to 
distinguish these epidemics and other ‘common diseases’ such as cancer and asthma because they 
affect people in developing countries as well as the infectious diseases, and the need for the 
medicine is the same.466 There is also a problem with the vagueness in the wording of paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the Decision, dealing with the prohibition of re-exportation of cheaper medicines back 
to the developed countries, and the assessment of manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector provided in the Annex of the Decision. Concrete interpretation on the part of the WTO is 
needed in order to make the rules more clear.467 Finally, I would like to point out two more 
problems that arise from both the 2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment. First, these instruments 
only pertain to WTO Member States, thereby excluding some of the LDCs in the world such as 
Somalia, Eritrea and South Sudan, which have no means to import the generic drugs without 
violating the IP rights owned by the pharmaceutical companies.468 Second, the TRIPS is to be 
amended when two thirds of the WTO Members have ratified the Article 31 waiver.469 The first 
deadline for this was 1 December 2007, but it is currently extended for the third time until 
2013.470 Until the conclusion of this thesis, only 45 States (including the EU) have accepted the 
Amendment, the last acceptance dating 31 July 2012.471 This cannot be seen as an expeditious 
solution to the problems identified in the Doha Declaration. 
In conclusion, putting aside all of the criticism, compulsory licenses, if used in non-
discriminative ways, and if some changes and clarifications are made, may promote access to 
medicines. As noted by Hestermeyer, they may be used not only as a remedy for the 
unwillingness of the patent holder to supply a market with his invention, but also as a sort of a 
threat used by governments when they need the industry to lower the prices of medicines, as was 
the case with the US Government and Bayer during the Anthrax scare.472 They were also used in 
this manner by Brazil and Thailand, in order to get discounted prices on patented medicines, 
which resulted in their population having affordable medicines.473 When the Brazilian President 
was asked to justify these actions, he claimed that ‘he was not willing to sacrifice the health of 
his country’s citizens for the sake of world trade’.474 This is a good example of the value of 
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compulsory licences, since Brazil managed to improve the enjoyment of the right to health of its 
citizens through the enactment of compulsory licensing legislation, even without issuing a single 
licence.475 As already stated, the 2003 system was used only once by Rwanda and Canada, since 
the developing countries are not enthusiastic about using it as they fear that they might ‘scare off’ 
future investments that could be made by the industry.476 However, they are a valuable tool. 
Although the Brazilian legislation was adopted before the 2003 system came into force, and 
although the 2003 Decision was implemented in only a few other countries, it does not mean that 
it will not bring improvement to access to medicines in the future. Until that happens, I believe 
that Article 30 solution should be revisited, if only as an alternative to the compulsory licensing.  
5.1.3 Generic Competition alternative 
Generic pharmaceutical competition has from its inception helped to bring down the 
prices of overly expensive patented medicines.477 A generic drug is defined by the WHO as ‘a 
pharmaceutical product, usually intended to be interchangeable with an innovator product, that is 
manufactured without a licence from the innovator company and marketed after the expiry date 
of the patent or other exclusive rights’.478 They are usually of the same effect as the patented 
medicines, but are provided at a significantly lower cost. 
Until 2005, the supply of the developing countries’ markets with essential medicines was 
mainly done with the help of generic companies from India and other countries with generic 
manufacturing capacitates. However, since 2005 this is no longer a possibility as these countries 
are under an obligation to provide for the patent protection of pharmaceuticals.479 Today the 
supply of the markets of developing countries with generics is mainly, although very rarely, done 
through compulsory licensing. Developed countries, most notably the US, have invested all of 
their efforts into preventing countries like SA and Brazil in improving access to medicines for 
their citizens through legislation that allows generic manufacturing and compulsory licensing 
through disputes before the WTO DSU. Although most of these disputes were resolved through 
settlement, they have undoubtedly slowed down the process of implementation of the contested 
legislation, while at the same time served as a sort of warning to other countries that may desire 
to improve their generic manufacturing capacities, that they should proceed with such policies 
only with great caution.  
It has been acknowledged that most of the essential medicines are now off patent and are 
available for generic production. Thus, the developing countries have been encouraged to 
produce the generic versions of these drugs in large quantities in order to ensure a better supply 
of their markets.480 Generic versions of drugs have been proven to lower prices of medicines 
whose patent terms have expired.481 But this is applicable only to off-patent drugs. The problem 
today is achieving a breakthrough concerning drugs for newly discovered diseases that are 
spreading very fast. There is no generic competition for these medicines, and therefore the prices 
of patented medicines are rapidly rising.482 This is the reason why generic companies need to 
invest into their own R&D structures. As for the already patented drugs and those that will be 
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patented in the future, the WHO is in favour of ‘“early workings” of patented drugs by generic 
manufacturers to encourage competition as a way of improving these products and providing 
early access to generic essential drugs’.483 The UN Millennium Project also expressed the need 
for the identification and adoption of strategies permitting ‘continued production and supply of 
low-cost generic medicines for poor populations after January 2005’ and encouraged exporting 
countries to adopt policies which should favour international competition in the pharmaceutical 
field.484 The fast introduction of generic medicines is also allowed by the TRIPS through the 
‘Bolar clause’, which could be subsumed under the Article 30 solution mentioned above. The 
Bolar clause, or the Bolar exemption, allows for the introduction of a generic drug immediately 
after the patent term has expired, by allowing ‘technical preparation for registration of the same 
medicine from an alternative source before the patent has expired’.485 This solution was upheld 
by the High Commissioner, who encouraged States to implement legislation allowing early 
testing and approval of generic drugs before patent expiry.486 Finally, the pharmaceutical 
companies could consider allowing generic manufacturing of the new essential medicines only 
for the developing countries’ markets. This could be done through special agreements with the 
generic industry that would serve to safeguard the generic medicines leaking into developed 
countries’ markets, as an alternative to differential pricing schemes that will be discussed below. 
This may be a long shot, but it is worth a try. 
5.2 Possible solutions 
The previous section has introduced the already existing solutions to the problem of 
access to medicines in developing countries. As well framed as they are, these solutions have not 
provided any significant improvements in this area. This is the reason why many organizations 
and scholars have invested a lot of effort into discovering alternative solutions that could be 
acceptable for both sides. I will first present the solution of price reductions for the developing 
countries - which has been highly contested by the industry - which could provide significant 
improvement in access to medicines, if applied correctly. Afterwards, I will present a potentially 
excellent solution developed by a team of distinguished professors, which includes, amongst 
others, Professors Thomas Pogge, Michael Abramowicz and James Love. This is followed by the 
proposal for the industry to work on their CSR schemes in order to improve their compliance 
with human rights law.  
5.2.1 Price reductions (differential pricing schemes) for poor countries 
vs. parallel imports 
Differential or preferential pricing schemes (DP), where pharmaceutical companies agree 
to sell their products for lower prices in developing countries487, have been proposed on many 
occasions as a solution to the conflict between access to medicines and pharmaceutical patents. It 
was stated by the WHO that preferential pricing is ‘essential for lower income countries and must 
be actively pursued’.488 Since prices are the greatest impediment to access to medicines, if the 
drugs were to be offered at a lower price, this problem would be greatly alleviated. This concept 
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has its roots in the concept of equity pricing introduced by the WHO in the late 1990s, which was 
based on the premise that ‘developing countries should not be asked to pay for medicine 
development cost, marketing, and shareholders return’, and was a much broader concept than 
DP.489 DP is the result of 30 years of successful practice of the concept of equity pricing.490 It 
means that the pharmaceutical industry should offer the medicines at production cost- ‘no profit 
to loss’ - to the low-income countries, and pursue this system in middle-income countries, with 
prices there not at marginal costs, but slightly higher.491 Examples of DF strategies were given by 
the CIPIH and they include, inter alia, discounts for certain categories of customers, setting the 
prices of patented medicines according to the generic equivalents, issuing voluntary licenses to 
generic manufacturers in developing countries for the production of medicines, drug donation 
programmes etc.492 
However, DP opens up the door to the anti-competition practice of parallel imports493, 
viewed by the pharmaceutical industry as breaching their IPRs. They contest that, if they were to 
offer medicines under lower prices in developing countries, these cheaper medicines might 
appear in the markets of developed countries, thereby undermining their companies’ interests.494 
Pogge argues that DP solution is ‘generally unworkable unless the different categories of buyers 
can be prevented from knowing about, or from trading with, one another’.495 
In order to get to the bottom of the issue of parallel imports, we need to address the 
doctrine of exhaustion, or the ‘first sale doctrine’.496 This doctrine provides that ‘where a 
patented product is placed on the market by the patent holder or with its consent, the patent 
holder has exhausted its patent rights and the buyer of the product is free to resell the product as it 
wishes’.497 Hereby, both the interests of the patent holder and the buyer are satisfied. There is no 
problem with this doctrine when it comes to national exhaustion, meaning when the patent owner 
has exhausted its rights and the product is available on the national market.498 However, there is 
great controversy when it comes to international exhaustion.499 The issue with international 
exhaustion is whether the TRIPS ‘provide[s] that a patent holder can prevent the importation of a 
product where the product has been placed on a foreign market by the patent holder itself or with 
its consent (parallel import)?’.500 The WTO decided that it is upon each Member to decide 
whether it will apply the national or the international doctrine of exhaustion.501 The TRIPS itself 
is ambiguous on this, stating that nothing in the Agreement ‘shall be used to address the issue of 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights’502 and consequently leaving the option of which 
doctrine to use to the Members of the WTO, subject to the most-favoured nation clause and the 
national treatment provision.503 According to the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
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(CIPR), in order for the DP system to succeed, the markets of developed and developing 
countries need to be segmented ‘to prevent low priced products undermining high priced 
markets’ and recommended that  
[d]eveloped countries should maintain and strengthen their legislative regimes to 
prevent imports of low priced pharmaceutical products originating from developing 
countries. However, to secure the segmentation of markets, it would also be desirable 
for developing countries to act to prevent exports to developed countries of drugs 
that are part of a donation or differential pricing scheme. It is especially important to 
avoid product diversion from those patients for whom the medicine is intended. But, 
recognising limitations in their capacity for enforcement, the primary burden of 
segmentation between developed and developing countries will realistically need to 
rest with developed countries.504  
As for the developing countries, CIPR concluded that they ‘should not eliminate potential 
sources of low cost imports from other developing or developed countries’ and that ‘[s]ince 
TRIPS allows countries to design their own exhaustion of rights regimes (a point restated at 
Doha), developing countries should aim to facilitate parallel imports in their legislation.’505 The 
use of the doctrine of international exhaustion was also upheld by the High Commissioner.506 I 
believe this solution is a good one, but needs to be approached with caution and with a sensible 
and practicable plan on how to prevent smuggling the cheap drugs into the developed countries. 
5.2.2 The Health Impact Fund 
The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a project which was devised by Professor Michael 
Abramowicz in 2003 and later developed through contributions of many distinguished professors, 
including Thomas Pogge, James Love, Tim Hubbard and Aidan Hollis.507 Concerned with the 
situation in the developing countries, where people live in hazardous environmental conditions 
which lead to the poor bearing a ‘hugely disproportionate burden of disease … and a hugely 
disproportionate share of premature deaths’508, these distinguished professors decided to come up 
with a solution which would ensure access to medicines and better pharmaceutical innovation at 
much lower cost. 
According to Pogge, who has written extensively on this subject509, pharmaceutical 
patents are necessary for the industry to protect itself from competition and illegal copying and a 
way for it to recoup its investments into R&D for the drugs, but ‘not everyone is either affluent 
enough to buy advanced medicines at very high prices or fortunate enough to need them only 
after patent expiration’.510 He identified the ‘main drawbacks of the newly globalized patent 
regime’ as high prices of medicines, neglect of R&D for diseases affecting the poor, bias towards 
maintenance drugs (the drugs that improve the lives and functioning of the patient without 
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removing the disease), wasting money on expensive litigation and patent filing in numerous 
jurisdictions, counterfeiting, excessive marketing and weak infrastructure in the developing 
countries.511 These impediments to access to medicines should be viewed and dealt with as a 
whole.  
Pogge also reminds that, notwithstanding their moral appeal, compulsory licenses may be 
counterproductive, since they are ‘energically resented’ by the industry, and governments do not 
want to use them so lightly, because they might ignite this resentment and be censured and sued 
by the companies and the developed countries opposing the system.512  
Therefore, a system where affordable medicines are available for both the developing and 
developed part of the world, and where R&D costs are funded by the government, needed to be 
constructed.513 There are two ways of enabling public funds, and they are known as ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ mechanisms. Unlike the push mechanism, where money is given by the government to an 
institution, usually universities, which is to discover and develop a new medicine, pull 
mechanisms are based on a sort of a competition, where a number of inventors engage in the 
R&D of a drug, and the one that comes with the best invention first is granted public financing.514 
According to Pogge, the latter is much better, since it is not based solely on trust for one 
particular institution, and if this institution fails to produce the medicine, all the financing is 
wasted.515 However, even the pull mechanisms have drawbacks, including the highly politicized 
process of deciding which diseases should be researched, and the possibility that they will fail in 
addressing the fourth drawback of the patent regime- the weak infrastructure in the developing 
countries, also known as ‘the last mile problem’.516 
Therefore, a number of experts sat down, and designed a system that would overcome all 
of these barriers mentioned above- the Health Impact Fund. HIF is conceived of as a system that 
is to be financed by governments, which offers patent holders the possibility to opt for a reward, 
instead of monopoly pricing, based on the global impact the newly discovered medicine has on 
health. The medicine would be registered at the Fund and sold at marginal costs globally. 
According to the success the medicine in alleviating suffering and addressing public needs in 
both developed and developing countries, the Fund would distribute money allocated for this 
proportionately. The fund would have at its disposition a large sum of money, which would reach 
as much as $6 billion annually.517 It would reward ‘any successful medicine in proportion to its 
success’, while this success will be defined ‘simply in terms of human health’.518 The most 
important aspect of the system is that HIF is designed to be optional for the industry, which can 
opt for the traditional patent system if it wishes.519 The system has its benefits for patients in both 
rich and poor countries, since it ‘directs research toward the medicines that can do the most 
good’.520 From the perspective of pharmaceutical companies, by using the HIF, they will avoid 
the reduction of profits connected to the increased access to medicines in developing countries. 
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Instead, they will have the possibility to even gain additional profits by developing new drugs for 
neglected diseases. They will also improve their reputation, since they will not have to defend 
their monopoly status, or be forced to donate to charity. They will simply ‘do well by doing 
good’.521 In the end, since the funds for the HIF are to be allocated through government support, 
which is usually done through taxes, the taxpayers will benefit from the system, as they will have 
access to low-cost medicines developed through it.522 Other obstacles to access to medicines 
would be overcome too, such as counterfeiting, since it will not be profitable anymore to those 
who engage in these activities, as cheap medicines will already be available, while the industry 
will also stop spending so much money on expensive litigation and patent registrations.523 
Finally, this system could be used not only to promote inventions in the pharmaceutical 
field, but also for other inventive ways to lower the burden of the disease in the developing 
countries, like water-cleaning systems which would enable access to safe drinking water, 
adequate sanitation and nutrition possibilities, providing mosquito nets and other physical 
protections against animal-transmitted diseases, and many others.524 Although some scholars 
have criticized this solution525, I believe it is a viable one, and the most likely to succeed in 
improving access to affordable essential medicines in developing countries. Therefore, all efforts 
should be invested into making this system work as it is designed, because none of the already 
existing ones have been so thoroughly researched and conceptualized. The drafters of the system 
have already established the next steps that need to be taken and how that should be done.526  
5.2.3 Good corporate citizenship- Implementation of CSR policies to 
improve access to medicines 
The implementation of CSR policies into business operations of pharmaceutical 
companies is not a solution to the problem of access to medicines per se, but merely a good start, 
since it shows that the company has committed itself to respecting human rights. Today, it is not 
possible to ‘operate a business globally while remaining totally aloof from social issues around 
it’.527 Although CSR is not enforceable, it is a proof that companies do care about human rights 
and are aware of their social responsibilities to both shareholders and stakeholders. Apart from 
that, it is great for the reputation of the company, since, by implementing CSR policies into their 
business, they will escape condemnation of the public, which can harm the reputation of the 
company severely. In this section, I will not address the issue of responsibility of businesses for 
respecting human rights in general, because that topic would entail a thesis of its own, but will 
only present the general framework of CSR, implemented in pharmaceutical industry. 
The former Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, has issued numerous reports and 
recommendations on how pharmaceutical companies should conduct their business in a manner 
supportive of the human right to health. In 2008, he visited the headquarters of GSK and issued a 
report reflecting on this visit.528 It the report he reminded that the Special Representative of the 
                                                 
521 Ibid, p. 2. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Pogge (n508), p. 152. 
524 Ibid, p. 153. 
525 E.g. Kathleen Liddell, ‘The Health Impact Fund: a critique, in Pogge et al. (eds.) (n142) at 155-80. 
526 http://healthimpactfund.com/next-steps/ (accessed on 24 April 2013). 
527 Siew-Kuan NG (n310), p. 125. 
528 UN HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt: Annex: mission to GlaxoSmithKline, A/HRC/11/12/Add.2, 18 
May 2009 [GSK Report 2009]. 
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Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, observed that ‘[c]ompanies need to adopt a human rights policy’ and 
that ‘[b]road aspirational language may be used to describe respect for human rights, but more 
detailed guidance in specific functional areas is necessary to give those commitments 
meaning’.529  
In his report, Hunt commended the GSK’s Corporate Responsibility Report from 2007, 
but raised concern about the fact that the subsequent Report from 2008 did not include the same 
commitment in the form of an approach called ‘Tearing down the barriers’ which concerned 
marketing medicines in middle-income countries.530 This approach was evaluated as ‘a promising 
initiative with the potential of enhancing access to medicines for many people’.531 He also said 
that GSK ‘deserves credit for significantly reducing some of its prices ... and enhancing access to 
medicines’, but again raised concerns about the prices of a few medicines that ‘remain beyond 
the reach of many millions of people for whom the medicine is literally a matter of life and 
death’, like Cervarix, a drug for the treatment of cervical cancer, whose price remains at $300, 
which is too high for people in developing countries.532 GSK was also praised for using of 
commercial and non-commercial voluntary licences and its recent announcement on patent 
pooling, but was instructed to improve its use of voluntary licensing.533 Finally, the Special 
Rapporteur concluded that: 
The status of innovator companies would be immeasurably enhanced if they did not 
see, and treat, patents as their “crown jewels”. Companies must grasp, and publicly 
recognize, their critically important social function and right-to-health 
responsibilities. They must demonstrably do everything possible, within a viable 
business model, to fulfil their social function and human rights responsibilities. 
Presently, this is not happening. If it were to happen, it would not only greatly 
enhance companies’ status but also pressurize States, generic manufacturers and 
others to provide the environment that companies need if they are to enter into 
arrangements, such as commercial voluntary licences, that enhance access to 
medicines for all.534 
Not long after the Special Rapporteur conducted the interviews and his mission in GSK, 
the company announced a number of important improvements to its access to medicines strategy, 
including significant price reductions in the LDCs, and in April 2009, in association with Pfizer 
announced their intention to jointly create a new company for the discovery and delivery of 
treatments for HIV.535 This is just one example on how CSR policies can improve the reputation 
of a pharmaceutical company, whose predecessors, not long before the Report was drafted, were 
amongst the 40 companies that jointly sued SA for trying to improve access to medicines of its 
people.536 
                                                 
529 Ibid, para. 7; UN HRC, ‘Protect, respect and remedy: a framework for business and human rights’, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 60. 
530 GSK Report (n528), para. 61. 
531 Ibid, para. 64. 
532 Ibid, paras. 65-6. 
533 Ibid, paras. 78-9. 
534 Ibid, para. 108. 
535 Ibid, para. 44. 
536 Ibid, para. 54. 
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5.3 Good Practices 
GSK is not a lonely example of good corporate governance in the pharmaceutical 
industry. The IFPMA has highlighted the significant contributions of ten largest pharmaceutical 
companies to health-related programmes in LDCs.537 Moreover, in 2008 and 2010, the Access to 
Medicine Index compared the efforts of 20 large drug companies in relation to access to 
medicines, and ranked them according to the assessment of their public policy influence and 
advocacy, pricing, patents and licensing, and donation programmes.538 In 2008, GSK was ranked 
first and was followed by NovoNordisk, Merck & Co., and Novartis. The ones that were ranked 
the lowest were: Pfizer, Wyeth, Teva Pharmaceutical, and Schering-Plough. In 2010, Gilead 
Sciences replaced NovoNordisk in the top four, and Merck KGaA, Takeda Pharmaceutical, 
Astellas Pharma, and Daiichi Sankyo Co were the bottom-ranked companies.539 
However, it is not the companies that invest the most effort into ensuring access to 
medicines. NGOs, PPPs and numerous initiatives on neglected diseases are those that should be 
thanked for the improvement of the situation in developing countries. The numerous NGOs were 
already mentioned throughout the thesis, but I will briefly mention them again. MSF, HAI, 
CPTech, Oxfam, as well as numerous national and regional organizations have put all of their 
efforts into improving access of people in developing countries to affordable essential medicines 
and joined developing countries in their fights against pharmaceutical companies and stringent 
patent protection. The efforts of numerous international organizations should also not be 
disregarded. The WHO, WTO, UNAIDS, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria and many others, have significantly contributed to the fight for better access to 
medicines.540 I will use this section to introduce a few bilateral donors, PPPs and initiatives that 
ensured that the problem of access to medicines and pharmaceutical patents came to light and 
stayed in the spotlight for years.  
Donor programmes have always been an indispensable source when it came to funding of 
health sectors in developing countries and enabling better access to essential medicines. 
Numerous developed countries’ institutions have formed donor programmes in order to help 
improve health care in developing countries. Some of the most successful ones are the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Danish International Development 
Agency (Danida), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID).541 Private donors that have had an outstanding impact 
on access to medicines are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William J. Clinton 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and many others.542 Together with the public donors 
they have formed numerous PPPs that help supply the markets of developing countries with 
essential medicines and in general, improve the health situation in these countries. The WHO has 
praised the PPPs for their ‘innovative service delivery strategies and positive consequences for 
national public health programmes’.543 One example of a good PPP is that of DHL and the UN 
                                                 
537 Siew-Kuan NG (n310), p. 126;  
538P. Hunt and R. Khosla, ‘Are Drug Companies Living Up to Their Human Rights Responsibilities? The Perspective 
of the Former United Nations Special Rapporteur (2002-2008)’ (2010) PLoS Medicine Vol. 7, Issue 9, p. 2. 
539 Ibid. 
540 See UN Millennium Project 2005 (n236), pp. 42-5. 
541 Ibid, pp. 45-6. 
542 Ibid, pp. 46-7. 
543 WHO, ‘Public–Private Partnerships: Managing contracting arrangements to strengthen the Reproductive and 
Child Health Programme in India: Lessons and implications from three case studies’ (2007) WHO/RHR/07.15, 
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Children's Fund (UNICEF), which partnered up ‘to reduce childhood mortality in Kenya’ by 
providing logistics expertise, transportation of bed nets and vaccines.544 
In the area of neglected diseases, there exist numerous initiatives and programmes that 
deal with the problem of neglect of pharmaceutical R&D for tropical diseases, such as the Special 
Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, which focuses on ‘neglected 
infectious diseases that disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations’.545 
Moreover, the Institute for One World Health is currently developing new, affordable medicines 
for these diseases.546 There is also the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) that 
concentrates mainly on sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis, malaria and Chagas disease. The goal of 
DNDi, as is that of almost all the initiatives, is to ‘mobilize the public sector in developing 
countries to conduct R&D on neglected diseases’.547  
As can be seen from this brief overview of good practices conducted by all the 
stakeholders in the access to medicines-pharmaceutical patents debate, there exists public 
awareness of the severity of the problem, and many are organizing themselves to address it the 
best way that they can. We can only hope that these collaborations and efforts will not remain a 
dead letter, but will develop into productive schemes that will help millions of people enjoy their 
human right to health in its full extent. 
5.4 Conclusion and some recommendations 
This Chapter has presented the existing and possible solutions to the problem of access to 
medicines in developing countries, and it can be deducted from it that there is prospect of 
improving this access on various levels. Health is a universal public good, and the enjoyment of 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health can only be ensured through international 
cooperation and transfer of technology. The TRIPS itself stipulates the importance of cooperation 
between developed and developing countries and encourages the developed part of the world to 
provide technical and financial assistance to the developing countries and LDCs.548 
On a national level, the countries need to draft a national health plan, which would be 
used to improve the health care systems in these countries and include the needs of all levels of 
the population, the diseases that are the most pressing and distribution of essential medicines.549 
The most important principle that developing countries need to have in mind is the principle of 
non-retrogression, meaning that the already achieved levels of access to medicines and enjoyment 
of the right to health cannot be diminished.550  
The WHO summarised the problem of access to medicines the following way: 
Too often, manufacturers who should be working to reduce prices are busy blaming 
unreliable supply systems; policy-makers in a position to influence drug financing 
                                                                                                                                                              
available at: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2007/WHO_RHR_07.15_eng.pdf, p. 1; UN Millennium Project 2005 
(n236), p. 59. 
544 K. Hayford, L. Privor-Dumm and O. Levine, ‘Improving Access to Essential Medicines Through Public-Private 
Partnerships’ (2011) International Vaccine Access Center (IVAC), p. 10-11; see also USAID Deliver Project at 
http://deliver.jsi.com/dhome (accessed on 25 April 2013).  
545 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 71, Box 3.1; http://www.who.int/tdr/en/ (accessed on 25 April 2013). 
546 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 72, Box 3.2; http://www.oneworldhealth.org/ (accessed on 25 April 2013). 
547 CIPIH Report 2006 (n27), p. 76, Box 3.5; http://www.dndi.org/ ( accessed on 25 April 2013). 
548 TRIPS Agreement, Arts. 66 and 67. 
549 Alma-Ata Declaration (n202); CESCR GC No. 14, para. 63; Clapham et al (eds.) (n183), pp. 45, 52; Minister of 
Health v. TAC (n245), para. 68 et al.; UN Special Rapporteur Report 2004 (n216), para. 53 et al. 
550 CESCR GC No. 14, para. 32. 
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are busy blaming high prices; and health care managers who could improve supply 
systems are busy blaming inadequate financing. Instead, all parties should work 
toward a common solution.551  
The former Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt stressed that enhancing access to medicines is 
a shared responsibility, and that MDGs recognized that pharmaceutical companies are one of 
those who bear this responsibility.552  
                                                 
551 WHO Drug Information (n277), p. 218. 
552 GSK Report (n528), para. 5; see MDG Report 2008 (n238). 
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6. Concluding remarks 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature and recommendations on this issue which 
currently circulate in the international forum, there is still no concrete solution which has been 
deemed acceptable for all the stakeholders. Many have engaged their effort and knowledge into 
finding such a solution, but it is upon the States, especially Members of the WTO, as well as 
international organizations and the pharmaceutical industry to decide which solution, if any, to 
uphold in practice. 
The TRIPS, while bringing immence progress in the IP protection for developed countries 
and the pharmaceutical industry, has in fact, considerably downgraded the process of 
development for developing countries. By imposing upon all Members the obligaiton to provide 
IP protection for all forms technologies, it has prevented developing states from deciding upon a 
strategy which would benefit their development, by for example excluding pharmaceutical 
patents from patentability, at least until the situation concerning the right to healht of their 
citizens has improved. In an ideal world everyone would be rich enough to buy medicines at the 
price set by the industry or lucky enough to need them only after patent protection expired, as 
stated by Pogge. Then patents would not just be acceptable, but would benefit everyone, 
everywhere. However, the reality is far from this ideal. Too many people around the world 
cannot even afford to feed themselves, let alone buy expensive medicines, and are already 
infected by a disease for which either only patented medicines exist, or there is no medicine 
whatsoever. 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health is indispensable for the enjoyment of 
all other rights, both civil and political and socio-economic. Without health, no other spheres of 
life can be realized in their full extent. The right to access to medicines forms an important part of 
the right to health, and could become a human right of its own, or at least a part of customary 
international law. People around the world, regardless of their country of residence or financial 
status, have the right to access affordable essential medicines, which are of good quality and to 
realize their right to health. The States have a duty to make this possible. The first step that needs 
to be taken is to ensure availability and affordability of essential medicines.  
In the meantime, while pharmaceutical companies weigh their profit against the decisions 
where to direct their R&D investments, millions of people die in both the developing and 
developed parts of the world. A sentence from Oscar Wilde illustrates the present situation 
perfectly: ‘Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing’.553 As was 
mentioned before, it is just a matter of time before certain diseases affecting only the developing 
countries spread to the developed part of the world. In order to prevent this from happening, 
pharmaceutical companies need to consider whether the medicines developed today are being 
utilised to serve their initial purpose, which is saving people’s lives, or are they simply a source 
of income for these companies’ shareholders. 
As we have seen, although the HIV/AIDS pandemic has had devastating effects 
worldwide, because of the pressures from NGOs and the commitment of the public sector, there 
now exist necessary treatments for this disease, and it is constantly being invested into R&D for 
drugs that would improve the quality of life for people living with it. In the begginigs of the 
pandemic, noone probably hoped that HIV/AIDS medicines will be accessible in the near future, 
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h.htm, Chapter 4. 
65 
 
 
 
and a few those who did were considered to be naïve and unrealistic.554 However, in 2007 there 
was a 45% increase in people receiving the necessary treatment in developing countries.555 This 
shows that if there is enough incentives and willingness from all the stakeholders involved, a lot 
can be done to improve access to necessary medicines, for whatever disease, in whichever part of 
the world.  
The example of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the way the international community dealt 
with it and keeps doing so, can serve as a great example for what should be done in order to 
improve access to essential medicines for all, without discrimination of any kind, especially the 
one stemming from the place of origin, financial and social status. Until this is done, the 
international community has numerous ways to improve access to medicines. I am of the opinion 
that the proposal of the fund which would reward the company whose medicines show positive 
impact for the treatment of a disease, is the one of the best proposals so far. It is a thought 
through, stable mechanism which could improve, and maybe even erase, the global drug gap.  
Both the pharmaceutical industry and human rights activists need to make compromises 
that will not be, by definition, ideal for either side. As long as there exist fundamental differences 
in approaches on both parts, there will not be a way to resolve this issue. A consensual approach 
to the conflict between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines will help them pave the 
way to, on one side, people enjoying their human rights in entirety, while on the other side 
inventors enjoying the fruits of their hard work. Of course, ‘removing the patent barrier will not 
miraculously produce access to medicines’556, since there will still remain the need for better 
funding for the medicines in both public and private health care facilities, for effective health care 
systems that are free from corruption, wise selections of drugs and better social security schemes, 
but as soon as the prices are lowered and as soon as more people can afford and access the 
necessary medicines, these other tasks will be much easier. We have passed the first two stages 
needed for the emergence of a new norm concernig the effect of pharmaceutical patents on the 
right to access to essential medicines, namely the persuation of norm enterprenours of the conflict 
between these two areas of law and it could be argued that the critical mass accepted it as 
existing.557 Now we need to take this norm out of the public debate and into a binding 
international treaty. 
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7. Supplement A- The 2003 Decision on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
WORLD TRADE         WT/L/540  
ORGANIZATION         2 September 2003  
(03-4582)  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
Decision of 30 August 2003558 
 
The General Council,  
Having regard to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization ("the WTO Agreement");  
Conducting the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the interval between meetings 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement;  
Noting the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the "Declaration") and, in particular, the instruction of the Ministerial 
Conference to the Council for TRIPS contained in paragraph 6 of the Declaration to find an 
expeditious solution to the problem of the difficulties that WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement and to report to the General Council before 
the end of 2002;  
Recognizing, where eligible importing Members seek to obtain supplies under the system 
set out in this Decision, the importance of a rapid response to those needs consistent with the 
provisions of this Decision;  
Noting that, in the light of the foregoing, exceptional circumstances exist justifying 
waivers from the obligations set out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products; 
 
Decides as follows:  
                                                 
558 This Decision was adopted by the General Council in the light of a statement read out by the Chairman, 
which can be found in JOB(03)/177. This statement will be reproduced in the minutes of the General Council to be 
issued as WT/GC/M/82.  
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1.  For the purposes of this Decision:  
(a)  "pharmaceutical product" means any patented product, or product manufactured 
through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the 
public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration. It is 
understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic 
kits needed for its use would be included559;  
(b)  "eligible importing Member" means any least-developed country Member, and 
any other Member that has made a notification560
 
to the Council for TRIPS of its 
intention to use the system as an importer, it being understood that a Member may 
notify at any time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for 
example only in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. It is noted that some 
Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as importing Members561
 
and that some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it would be 
in no more than situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency;  
(c)  "exporting Member" means a Member using the system set out in this Decision to 
produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible importing 
Member.  
2.  The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to the extent 
necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an 
eligible importing Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below in this paragraph:  
(a)  the eligible importing Member(s)562
 
has made a notification
2 
to the Council for 
TRIPS, that:  
(i)  specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed563;  
(ii)  confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a 
least-developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the 
product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the Annex to this 
Decision; and  
                                                 
559 This subparagraph is without prejudice to subparagraph 1(b).  
560 It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set 
out in this Decision. 
561 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
562 Joint notifications providing the information required under this subparagraph may be made by the regional 
organizations referred to in paragraph 6 of this Decision on behalf of eligible importing Members using the system 
that are parties to them, with the agreement of those parties. 
563 The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO website 
dedicated to this Decision. 
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(iii)  confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has granted or 
intends to grant a compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the provisions of this Decision564;  
(b)  the compulsory licence issued by the exporting Member under this Decision shall contain the 
following conditions:  
(i)  only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this 
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs 
to the Council for TRIPS;  
(ii)  products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as being 
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific 
labelling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through 
special packaging and/or special colouring/ shaping of the products 
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a 
significant impact on price; and  
(iii)  before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website565
 
the 
following information:  
- the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent (i) 
above; and  
- the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) above;  
(c)  the exporting Member shall notify566
 
the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the licence, including 
the conditions attached to it.567 The information provided shall include the name and address of the 
licensee, the product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has 
been granted, the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of 
the licence. The notification shall also indicate the address of the website referred to in 
subparagraph (b)(iii) above.  
3.  Where a compulsory licence is granted by an exporting Member under the system 
set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be paid in that Member taking into account the economic value to the importing 
Member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Member. Where a compulsory 
licence is granted for the same products in the eligible importing Member, the obligation of that 
Member under Article 31(h) shall be waived in respect of those products for which remuneration 
in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in the exporting Member. 
4.  In order to ensure that the products imported under the system set out in this 
Decision are used for the public health purposes underlying their importation, eligible importing 
                                                 
564 This subparagraph is without prejudice to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
565 The licensee may use for this purpose its own website or, with the assistance of the WTO Secretariat, the page on 
the WTO website dedicated to this Decision.  
566 It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set 
out in this Decision. 
567 The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO website 
dedicated to this Decision.  
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Members shall take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative 
capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products that have 
actually been imported into their territories under the system. In the event that an eligible 
importing Member that is a developing country Member or a least-developed country Member 
experiences difficulty in implementing this provision, developed country Members shall provide, 
on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in 
order to facilitate its implementation.  
5.  Members shall ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the 
importation into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system set out in 
this Decision and diverted to their markets inconsistently with its provisions, using the means 
already required to be available under the TRIPS Agreement. If any Member considers that such 
measures are proving insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be reviewed in the Council for 
TRIPS at the request of that Member.  
6.  With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing 
purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products:  
(i)  where a developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a 
regional trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
and the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), 
at least half of the current membership of which is made up of countries presently 
on the United Nations list of least-developed countries, the obligation of that 
Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived to the 
extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a 
compulsory licence in that Member to be exported to the markets of those other 
developing or least-developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that 
share the health problem in question. It is understood that this will not prejudice 
the territorial nature of the patent rights in question;  
(ii)  it is recognized that the development of systems providing for the grant of 
regional patents to be applicable in the above Members should be promoted. To 
this end, developed country Members undertake to provide technical cooperation 
in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement, including in conjunction 
with other relevant intergovernmental organizations.  
7.  Members recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and 
capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem identified in 
paragraph 6 of the Declaration. To this end, eligible importing Members and exporting Members 
are encouraged to use the system set out in this Decision in a way which would promote this 
objective. Members undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of 
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in the work to be undertaken 
pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 7 of the Declaration and any other 
relevant work of the Council for TRIPS.  
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8.  The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system set out 
in this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and shall annually report on its 
operation to the General Council. This review shall be deemed to fulfil the review requirements 
of Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement. 
9.  This Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that 
Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and (h) of 
Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration, and to their interpretation. It is also 
without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical products produced under a compulsory 
licence can be exported under the present provisions of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
10.  Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the 
provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article 
XXIII of GATT 1994.  
11.  This Decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each 
Member on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions 
takes effect for that Member. The TRIPS Council shall initiate by the end of 2003 work on the 
preparation of such an amendment with a view to its adoption within six months, on the 
understanding that the amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this Decision and on the 
further understanding that it will not be part of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 45 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).  
ANNEX 
Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.  
For other eligible importing Members insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the 
product(s) in question may be established in either of the following ways:  
(i)  the Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in 
the pharmaceutical sector;  
OR  
(ii)  where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has 
examined this capacity and found that, excluding any capacity owned or 
controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of 
meeting its needs. When it is established that such capacity has become sufficient 
to meet the Member's needs, the system shall no longer apply.  
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